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BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS: THE CASE FOR A LONG-TERM 
INVESTMENT APPROACH 
Jeffrey Manns* 
Abstract 
 
The Article seeks to fill a crucial gap in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: the failure to create a framework for 
dealing with future financial bailouts. It argues that the federal 
government’s  ad  hoc,  “break  even”  approach  to  the  recent  bailouts  not  only  
shortchanged taxpayers, but more importantly failed to provide deterrence 
against the type of reckless risk-taking that led to the financial crisis. This 
Article argues that the key to legitimizing future bailouts and limiting 
moral hazard is to institutionalize a long-term investment-oriented 
approach that delineates clear contours and conditions for aid. It calls for 
establishing an independent agency, the Federal Government Investment 
Corporation (FGIC), to serve as an investor of last resort, which would 
make bailout monies contingent on beneficiaries sharing both risks and 
long-term returns with taxpayers. The FGIC would establish express, ex 
ante conditions for providing aid that would temper corporate risk-taking, 
protect taxpayers, and establish bounds to bailouts. Tying government 
bailouts to shared sacrifices with managers, shareholders, and creditors of 
beneficiaries, proportional profit sharing with taxpayers, and corporate 
governance reforms would help to ensure that future bailouts serve a 
productive purpose.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the financial crisis has subsided, politicians have responded to 
backlashes at Wall Street profits by renouncing bailouts en masse. 
Republicans who voted for bailouts now decry this government aid as 
misguided,1 while Democrats have optimistically proclaimed that the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was so 
comprehensive that it will make corporate bailouts a relic of the past.2 The 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Bailout Is a Potent Issue for Fall 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/us/politics/11tarp.html 
(observing how Republican incumbents who voted for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
now  treat  bailouts  as  “toxic”  because  of  the  popular  backlash). 
 2. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Finance Bill Consensus on a Point: No Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/business/16fail.html (discussing the Obama 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777562
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reality is quite different, as the prospect of bailouts will continue to shape 
financial markets and risk-taking.3 The question is not whether bailouts 
will happen, but rather how, when, and to what degree government 
intervention will be necessary to support financial firms during a crisis.4 
The challenge is how to create a lasting framework to ensure that bailouts 
serve their avowed purpose of mitigating systemic risks, yet safeguard 
taxpayers’  interests  in  the  process.5 
This Article argues that the federal government should approach 
                                                                                                                     
Administration’s  belief  that  the  financial  reform  bill  would  ensure  that  “[t]axpayers  should  never  
again  have  to  bail  out  giant  financial  institutions”);;  see also David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 
EMORY L.J. 97, 121–29 (2010) (discussing the Dodd-Frank  Act’s  focus  on  winding  up  distressed  
financial  companies  and  Congress’  express  disavowal  of  future  bailouts). 
 3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s  Guide”  to  Sovereign  Debt  Restructuring, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1189, 1195 (2004) (observing   how   “bailouts   increase   ‘moral   hazard’   by   rewarding   and  
encouraging bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking   by   banks”);;   Arthur   E.  
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of 
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 971–72 (2009) (discussing how the potential 
for  bailouts  continues  to  spur  banks’  excessive  risk-taking).  
 4. See, e.g., Mariya Deryugina, Shaping Global Financial Reform: A Symposium for Private 
and Public Sector Leaders, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 683, 707–08 (2008) (discussing the 
academic  consensus  that  “government  bailouts  of  large  systemically  significant  institutions . . . are 
inevitable . . . to  prevent  systemic  disruption”). 
 5. The financial crisis has led to a myriad of proposals about how to preempt future crises. 
Some commentators have sought to reduce risk by curbing the size of financial institutions. See, 
e.g., Markus Brunnermeier et al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, 11 GENEVA 
REPORT ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 1, 26 (2009) (calling for asset limits on banks to avoid the 
creation   of   “national   champions”   that   are   “so   large,   so   massively   interconnected,   and   so  
iconic . . . that  no  government  would  ever  allow  them  to  fail”).  Others  have  called for mandatory 
insurance on all financially related institutions to limit systemic risk exposure. See, e.g., Lasse 
Pedersen & Nouriel Roubini, Comment, A Proposal to Prevent Wholesale Financial Failure, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at 11. Other ideas for potential   ex   ante   reforms   include   tying  bankers’  
compensation to the degree banks engage in risk mitigation by linking banker pay to their 
companies’   public   subordinated   debt, see Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: 
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); compartmentalizing 
different financial markets through firewalls that are reminiscent of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 
see GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 26–28 (2009), 
available at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for_Financial 
_Stability.pdf; and imposing capital structure reforms designed to mitigate systemic risk and 
improve resiliency, see Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank 
Regulation, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224, 233–35 (2009). Other commentators have embraced the 
Administration’s  proposal   for   financial   reform   that empowers regulators to seize and wind up 
systemically important entities to facilitate swift responses to financial crises. See, e.g., Edward R. 
Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of 
Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 449, 462–63 (2009). What distinguishes 
this  Article’s  proposal  is  that  it  seeks  to  institutionalize  an  independent  agency  as  an  investor  of  last  
resort and to delineate clear bailout criteria ex ante. This approach would equip the investor of last 
resort to respond to future crises in a proactive way, rather than simply place faith in regulatory 
reforms or limits to mitigate systemic risks. 
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bailouts as long-term investments, so that aid may stabilize financial 
markets during crises, yet simultaneously deter beneficiaries from reckless 
risk-taking in the future. During the recent crisis, the federal government 
gave   financial   firms   aid   on   generous   terms   based   on   a   “break   even”  
approach for its overall investments. The government prematurely 
liquidated investments without imposing meaningful reforms on 
beneficiaries  or  reaping  returns  to  justify  the  government’s  assumption  of  
risk.6 The net result was to magnify moral hazard by failing to create 
disincentives for firms to sustain high leverage, recklessly speculate, and to 
seek bailout aid when bets go awry.7 
This Article proposes institutionalizing a long-term investment 
approach to ensure that bailouts combine taxpayer returns with shared 
sacrifice by beneficiaries and structural reforms to mitigate moral hazard. It 
calls for the creation of an independent agency, the Federal Government 
Investment  Corporation  (FGIC),  which  would  serve  as  an  “investor  of  last  
resort”  during  financial  crises.  The  FGIC  would  seek  to  depoliticize  future  
bailouts by establishing clear contours and conditions for aid and 
mandating that beneficiaries share risks and returns with the federal 
government.8 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, The Obama Agenda and the Enthusiasm Gap, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039993045753994208150 
17804.html  (lamenting  the  fact  that  “TARP  increasingly  looked  to  many  Americans  like  a  giant  
political  payoff,”  as  “60%  of  [poll]  respondents  felt  that  ‘large  banks’  had  been helped  ‘a  lot’  or  ‘a  
fair  amount’  by  government  economic  policies,  but  only  13%  felt  that  the  ‘average  working  person’  
had  been”). 
 7. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial 
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks than the Previous Ones?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
1339, 1388–89 (2011).   
 8. During the recent crisis, the federal government assumed a role of liquidity provider of 
last resort, as multiple government agencies provided emergency support to the financial sector at 
nominal cost or break even rates at best. A number of academics have recognized the significance of 
this emergency liquidity provider role in stabilizing the economy during financial crises. See, e.g., 
Stanley Fischer, On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
85, 85–89 (1999) (calling for international cooperation to provide emergency liquidity for financial 
markets due to the limited financial capacities of individual governments); Xavier Freixas et al., The 
Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century Approach, 2 J. EUR. ECON ASS’N 1085, 1085–87 
(2004)  (providing  a  comparative  perspective  on  the  government’s  role  in  providing  emergency  
liquidity during financial crises); Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial 
Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 94, 105–
06 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (calling for the creation of an 
equivalent of the market maker liquidity provider role for individual stocks for debt markets as a 
whole to ensure liquidity for emergency sales of debt); Robert M. Solow, On the Lender of Last 
Resort, in FINANCIAL CRISES: THEORY, HISTORY, AND POLICY (Charles P. Kindleberger et al. eds., 
1982) (laying out   the  government’s   indispensable  role  in  providing  emergency  liquidity).  This  
Article argues that the federal government cannot simply serve as a liquidity provider that provides 
implicit and explicit subsidies to failing financial firms on an ad hoc basis. Instead, this Article 
makes the innovative argument that the federal government should embrace the mantle of a long-
term investor and establish clear ex ante bailout conditions both to compensate taxpayers for the 
2011] BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS 1353 
 
The FGIC would serve as the bailout complement to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and fill financing gaps during future 
crises.9 While   the   FDIC’s   function   is   to  wind   up   insolvent   banks   and  
systemically important financial institutions,10 there is no single 
government institution currently in a position to address future bailouts.11 
For example, during the current crisis, policymakers cobbled together a 
hodgepodge of bridge loan sources, including emergency lending and 
guarantees from the Federal Reserve, FDIC-backed loans, and Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) investments administered by the Treasury 
Department.12 Consolidating investment functions in a single institution 
would  make  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  U.S.’s  role  as  an  investor  more  
transparent.13 This approach would centralize accountability for 
beneficiaries and make it easier to monitor the federal government’s  
stewardship in administering bailouts.14      
The objective of the FGIC would be to establish express, ex ante 
conditions for receiving aid that temper corporate risk-taking, protect 
taxpayers, and establish clear contours for bailouts. First, aid would be 
contingent on managers, shareholders, and creditors of beneficiaries facing 
                                                                                                                     
government’s  assumption  of  risk  and  to provide disincentives for over-reliance on bailouts and 
leveraged speculation. 
 9. See Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
429, 472–75   (1994)   (discussing   the   evolution   of   the   FDIC’s   bank   liquidation   and   alternative 
resolution procedures); Stanley V. Ragalevsky & Sarah J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a Bank Failure, 126 
BANK. L.J. 867, 868–70 (2009) (discussing the role and workings of the FDIC).  
 10. The Dodd-Frank Act designated commercial banking groups with assets of $50 billion or 
more   as   “systemically   important   financial   institutions”   (SIFIs),   and   empowered   the   Financial  
Stability Oversight Council—in consultation with the Federal Reserve—to determine which non-
bank financial institutions should be treated as SIFIs. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank 
Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 ORE. L. REV. 951, 
993–96 (2011). SIFIs are subject to special prudential standards and are potentially subject to 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) wind-ups. In contrast, this Article embraces a broader 
conception  of  “systemically   significant”   firms   that  may  be  potential  bailout  beneficiaries.  One  
premise of this Article is that firms that are smaller than $50 billion may still raise systemic risks, 
and therefore the FGIC would have discretion to offer bailouts without being restricted to particular 
firm capitalization thresholds.       
 11. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 216 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of having the government fail to provide market 
liquidity during a crisis). 
 12. See Joe Nocera, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) 
(discussing the broad range of measures that the federal government used to address the financial 
crisis).  
 13. Consolidation of this investor role in the FGIC would reduce the conflict of interests other 
agencies face from simultaneously assuming regulatory and bailout roles. See Richard W. Painter, 
Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics when Government Pays the Tab, 41 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 154–57 (2009). 
 14. See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1374–76 (2010) (discussing how the financial crisis 
and bailouts have led to demands for greater accountability). 
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upfront reductions in their respective stakes (based on the scale of the 
FGIC’s  investment)  to  deter  overreliance  on  bailout  funds  and  excessive  
risk-taking. Second, the FGIC would assume a proportional stake in 
beneficiaries  and  tie  FGIC  returns  to  beneficiaries’  returns  over  a  long-term 
period. Third, FGIC investments would be contingent on bailout 
beneficiaries implementing corporate governance reforms, including the 
appointment  of  independent  directors  in  proportion  to  the  government’s  
stake and adoption of substantive reforms to target the roots of systemic 
risk.15 
A significant challenge this proposal faces is how to avoid having 
FGIC investments cause government overstretch and excessive 
entanglement with the private sector. Not only must the conditions the 
FGIC imposes be draconian enough to deter corporations from seeking 
FGIC funds except in extremis, but also the FGIC must face limits on when 
it is able to make investments, the level and duration of those investments, 
and the degree of control it can exert over private companies. 
The FGIC must face constraints that place prospective beneficiaries on 
clear  notice  about  the  contours  of  potential  aid  and  the  FGIC’s  limits. It 
would restrict eligibility for FGIC investments to systemically significant 
institutions and require the FGIC to certify that funding is necessary to 
address systemic risks.16 The FGIC would be required to establish capital 
requirement guidelines (analogous to capital requirements that commercial 
banks currently face) to ensure that bailout beneficiaries have a realistic 
prospect of repaying those investments.17 These guidelines would serve to 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Under the TARP, the Treasury Department has the right to appoint two government 
directors to boards of bank beneficiaries who miss their payment obligations for six consecutive 
quarters (i.e., 1.5 years). Only nine tiny banks are at or one missed payment away from this 
milestone, and the Treasury Department has yet to act on appointing directors. See OFFICE OF THE 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 72 (2010), available at http://sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/July2010_Quarterly_ 
Report_to_Congress.pdf. This Article argues that the independent appointment of directors should 
serve as much more than a belated afterthought for failing companies and should instead constitute 
a quid pro quo for any bailout aid. See infra Subsection III.B.3. 
 16. This  Article  has  a  broader  conception  of  “systemically  significant”  financial  firms  or  
institutions than the Dodd-Frank  Act’s view of SIFIs—commercial banking groups and other 
financial institutions with $50 billion or more of assets who face special prudential standards and 
are potentially subject to OLA wind-ups. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A 
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 993–96 
(2011).  The  FGIC  would  have  discretion  to  designate  smaller  firms  as  “systemically  significant”  
and  eligible  for  bailouts  if  the  firms’  “default”  or  “danger  of  default”  “would  have serious adverse 
effects  on  financial  stability  or  economic  conditions  in  the  United  States.”  The Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1603(b), (d) (2010).  
 17. See., e.g., J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. REG. 283,  301  (2010)  (discussing  how  financial  regulators  can  shape  a  bank’s  
business model by adjusting capital requirements); see also Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing 
Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26–28 (2010) (arguing that the design of capital 
requirements  is  key  for  shaping  banks’  risk-taking). 
2011] BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS 1355 
 
delineate the dividing line between the respective roles of the FGIC and 
FDIC in investing in and winding down systemically significant 
institutions. 
The FGIC would also face substantive limits on the amount and 
duration of its investments in a particular institution to prevent de facto 
nationalization of private enterprises. Investments would need to be capped 
at a percentage of the equity holdings of beneficiaries to ensure that the 
other stakeholders will still have significant skin in the game.18 The 
duration of investments should also be limited to a five-year period, a time 
frame designed to be sufficient to provide support for the financial industry 
through a cyclical correction and rebound. Lastly, concerns about 
entanglement   suggest   that  directors   for  beneficiaries’  boards  should  be  
selected by an independent  panel  to  represent  the  government’s  stake,  in  
order to heighten oversight of beneficiaries without having direct 
government involvement in the day-to-day operation of the business. 
Similarly, the FGIC could mandate that beneficiaries adopt systemic 
reforms as an ex ante condition for receiving bailout monies, so that 
bailouts  do  not  paradoxically  “stabilize”  industry  lobbyists  on  Capitol  Hill  
and therefore stymie reforms.19 
Skeptics would argue that there is no point in imposing limits on 
bailouts because if a crisis is large enough, politicians and regulators will 
suspend the rules once again just as they did during the current crisis.20 It is 
true that politicians always have the ability to nationalize failing companies 
or to federalize private sector debt or liabilities with no strings attached. 
Nothing short of a constitutional amendment can fully constrain this 
power.21 However, just as the existence of the FDIC has caused the process 
for winding down banks to become less politicized,22 the  FGIC’s  objective 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank 
Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 836 (2010) (discussing how the absence  of  “skin  in  the  game,”  that  is,  
a direct financial stake, skewed the incentives of issuers of securitizations). 
 19. The $251 million that financial institutions spent during the first half of 2010 to blunt the 
scope and impact of financial reforms is a telling indicator of how much the bailouts empowered 
lobbyists at the expense of taxpayers and the public interest. See Joshua M. Brown, How Wall Street 
Uses Your Money to Lobby Against You, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Aug. 3, 2010; see also Eric 
Lichtblau, Ex-Regulators Get Set to Lobby on New Financial Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010 
(discussing how 150 former banking regulators signed up as lobbyists this year in order to profit 
from the 243 financial rules and sixty-seven studies that regulators will conduct to implement the 
Dodd-Frank Act). 
 20. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 
472–73 (2010) (discussing how regulators have routinely suspended prompt corrective action rules 
when systemically important companies stumble). 
 21. See Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. 
L. REV. 1137, 1209 n.334 (1997) (suggesting that only a constitutional amendment could impose 
limits  on  Congress’  spending  powers). 
 22. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1647 & n.308 (2008) (discussing how the 
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would  be  to  reduce  politicians’  role  in  the  bailout  process  by  establishing  
clear, settled expectations of the tradeoffs beneficiaries face for receiving 
bailouts.23 
Part I of this Article will delineate the distinctiveness of bailouts from 
other forms of government interventions, such as nationalizations, 
federalizations, and wind-ups.24 Part II will lay out the shortcomings and 
costs of the recent bailouts and underscore the need to create a framework 
to deal with future crises. Part III will make the case for institutionalizing 
an investor of last resort and lay out a blueprint for the FGIC to ensure that 
beneficiaries shoulder the risks and returns of future bailouts with 
taxpayers. 
I.  NATIONALIZATIONS, FEDERALIZATIONS, BAILOUTS, AND WIND-UPS 
A.  The Inevitability of Government Intervention During Financial 
Crises 
However much policymakers have sought to appease public outrage by 
proclaiming the end of bailouts,25 it has not changed the reality that 
circumstances may require the government to intervene to support or wind 
up private companies.26 The question is how to condition the triggers, 
                                                                                                                     
institutional design of the FDIC makes bank wind-ups less politicized); see also Steven A. Ramirez, 
Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 511 (2000) (discussing how 
institutional design can mitigate the politicization of financial regulatory agencies). 
 23. This  proposal’s  approach  is  designed  to  lay  the  groundwork  for  proactive intervention, 
rather than reactive regulation that is focused on the last crisis. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next 
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 
419–22 (2006) (discussing how policymakers myopically focus on the last crisis when designing 
regulation); see also Heidi M. Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 
479–82 (1998) (discussing the problem of reactive regulation). 
 24. Remarkably little has been written on the theoretical foundations for emergency 
government interventions in the economy. Cheryl Block wrote an insightful public choice analysis 
of  politicians’  incentives  for  shadow  bailouts  that  anticipated  responses  to  the  recent  financial  crisis.  
See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 
951, 953–57 (1992). Cheryl Block has also written a more recent article that documented the off-
budget accounting that obscured the costs of bailouts and called for transparency and on-budget 
accounting for public bailouts through use of the tax system and other regulatory regimes. See 
Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 152–
54 (2010). Adam Levitin recently wrote a thorough survey piece chronicling different approaches 
towards bailouts and focusing on the intersection of bailouts and bankruptcy resolutions. Adam J. 
Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 461–90 (2011). In contrast, this Article is the first 
to develop the distinctions of bailouts from other forms of government interventions, such as 
nationalizations, federalizations, and wind-ups. Additionally, this Article lays out an innovative 
policy approach for institutionalizing bailouts by calling for the formation of an independent agency 
to serve as a standing bailout investor of last resort. 
 25. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 2 (discussing how the Obama Administration believes that the 
financial reform bill will eliminate the need for future bailouts). 
 26. See, e.g., Mariya Deryugina, Shaping Global Financial Reform: A Symposium for Private 
and Public Sector Leaders, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 683, 707–08 (2008) (discussing the 
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contours, and consequences of government intervention. Part of the 
problem is that bailouts became an open-ended concept throughout the 
financial crisis, and neither policymakers nor academics grappled with the 
basic challenge of defining bailouts and their proper scope.27 The 
amorphousness of what constitutes a bailout may have initially provided 
political cover during the crisis by allowing the Bush and Obama 
Administrations to provide aid with little strings attached to an ever-
growing array of financial and nonfinancial firms.28 But in the long run, the 
absence of a coherent framework for (or understanding of) bailouts aroused 
a backlash.29 Disapproval surged as citizens witnessed large-scale transfers 
from the public to private sector that benefited Wall Street, yet appeared to 
offer taxpayers very little in return for the risks the government assumed.30  
This Article seeks to fill these theoretical and practical gaps concerning 
what constitutes bailouts by distinguishing bailouts from three other forms 
of emergency government interventions: nationalizations of companies, 
federalizations of private debt and liabilities, and wind-ups of financial 
firms. Nationalizations and federalizations are political decisions for the 
government to take over private enterprises or to assume private debts or 
liabilities respectively. Both entail clear expectations of significant losses 
at the time liabilities are assumed and potentially for the foreseeable future.  
For example, during the financial crisis, the federal government 
nationalized the mortgage intermediaries of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
and took on losses of $160 billion, a figure that may ultimately rise to 
$1 trillion.31 Similarly, the federal government routinely federalizes private 
pension shortfalls when the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation takes 
over  failing  companies’  pension  plans.32 
                                                                                                                     
academic  consensus   that  “government  bailouts  of large systemically significant institutions are 
inevitable . . . to  prevent  systemic  disruption”).   
 27. See Levitin, supra note 24, at 443–45 (discussing the amorphousness of the concepts of 
systemic risk and bailouts). 
 28. See Jim Puzzanghera & Martin Zimmerman, Bush Extends Aid to Carmakers, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2008, at 1 (discussing how the Bush Administration extended TARP aid to General Motors 
and Chrysler, even though the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 only deemed 
financial institutions eligible for bailout aid). 
 29. See Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 1 (discussing how both Republican and Democratic 
supporters of the TARP legislation have faced significant political backlashes). 
 30. The juxtaposition of record profits for Wall Street firms against 10% unemployment 
understandably led many to the question the purpose of bailouts. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 6 
(documenting the scale of discontent). 
 31. See Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1 
Trillion Worst Case, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2010, 7:00 PM) (discussing $160 billion in losses from 
the Fannie and Freddie bailouts with upwards of $1 trillion in potential total losses); see also Steven 
M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation  by  Deal:  The  Government’s  Response  to  the  Financial  
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 488 (2009) (observing that the federal government assumed liability 
for $5.14 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and guarantees from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 32. See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 
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In contrast, wind-ups consist of the federal government temporarily 
assuming control of insolvent banks or systemically important financial 
firms to expedite their liquidation.33 The FDIC has long bypassed 
bankruptcy proceedings for insolvent banks by conducting swift, 
depoliticized sales to minimize losses and any impact on the economy.34 
Bailouts are distinguishable from nationalizations, federalizations, and 
wind-ups because the government does not assume direct control of either 
corporate beneficiaries or their existing liabilities. Instead, bailouts entail 
government investments to provide private enterprises with liquidity and 
stability during financial crises, which must be linked with investment 
returns  and  conditions  to  cover  the  government’s  assumption  of  risk  and  to  
mitigate moral hazard.35 
1.  Nationalizations and Federalizations 
Nationalizations consist of the government taking control of private 
enterprises.36 The closely related concept of federalization entails the 
government assuming private debts or liabilities with no strings attached. 
Both nationalizations and federalizations are political decisions, made 
when Congress or the President decides that a faltering enterprise is too 
significant to the economy to allow it to fail. Therefore, the federal 
government assumes direct control of a private enterprise or takes on the 
corporation’s  debt  or  liabilities  with  a  likelihood  of  continued  losses  for  the 
foreseeable future. The possibility of nationalization of companies or 
federalization of losses creates a clear moral hazard for externalizing the 
costs of risk-taking onto the government.37 However, it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                     
ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 57 (2004) (discussing how the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation federalizes 
pension liabilities of failing companies); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1305  (2006)  (laying  out  the  PBGC’s  
mandate). 
 33. The federal government directly assumes control of failing enterprises in the case of FDIC 
and Government Supervised Entity receiverships (for example, in the case of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35A, § 4617 (2006). Additionally, bankruptcy resolution 
systems under Chapters 7, 11, and 13 allow corporations to work through the bankruptcy court to 
reorganize or wind down. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–07; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–16. 
 34. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1007–09  (2010)  (discussing  the  rationale  for  the  FDIC’s  bypass  of  
bankruptcy proceedings). 
 35. See Block, supra note 24, at 155–56. 
 36. See Pryia Alagiri, Comment, Give  Us  Sovereignty  or  Give  Us  Debt:  Debtor  Countries’  
Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 485, 508 (1992). Takings form a subset 
of nationalizations. Id. As the recent crisis highlighted, the government may serve as the receiver of 
last resort in assuming control of insolvent, systemically important companies, such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. See Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, 
and the Current  Surge  of  Government’s  Size,  Scope,  and  Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 
547 (2010). While these moves can be framed in takings terms, they are more akin to abandonment, 
as the net value of most nationalizations in the United States is generally negative. 
 37. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
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imagine that opportunistic politicians will be completely held back from 
assuming control of politically sensitive enterprises or liabilities when the 
crisis is large enough.38 
The   word   “nationalization”   is   rarely   heard   in   U.S. politics, as 
politicians and policymakers shy away from characterizing government 
takeovers of private companies as such.39 American politicians generally 
act as if nationalizations occur only in distant, authoritarian countries—
certainly not here, not because of our popular faith in free enterprise and 
concerns about government entanglement in the economy.40 There is some 
truth to this distinction, as the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution 
dictates that nationalizations in the United States are generally tools for the 
government’s   assumption   of   liabilities,   rather   than   for   government  
expropriation of assets from the private sector.41 Nonetheless, the federal 
government has used nationalizations of corporations and federalizations 
of liabilities as policy tools to combat crises. The government merely 
engages in semantic gamesmanship when it characterizes this activity as a 
“bailout”  rather  than  a  “nationalization”  or  “federalization.”42 
For  example,  the  government’s  assumption  of  control  of  Fannie  Mae  
and Freddie Mac meant it assumed liability for at least $160 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities and guarantees (with upwards of $1 trillion of 
potential losses).43 Politicians have gone to great pains to avoid framing 
                                                                                                                     
the New York University Law School: Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070411a.htm (discussing 
how confidence in the availability of government intervention may undermine market discipline 
towards banks taking excessive risks). 
 38. Even a constitutional amendment may not stand in the way of nationalizations or 
federalizations   in   a   large   enough   crisis.   The   nation’s   experience   during   the  Great  Depression  
demonstrated how limiting interpretations of federal powers under the Constitution will likely give 
way under strong pressures for government intervention. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme 
Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law & Political Science, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 352,  373  (2010)  (“Franklin  Roosevelt  won  broad  acceptance  for  his  constitutional  vision  in  
the context of the Great Depression.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Deficit: Applying Lessons from the 
Economic Recession, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 651,   656   (2009)   (observing   how   the   “flirtation   with  
nationalization   was   astounding”   during   the   depths   of   the   financial   crisis   as   the   “idea   of  
nationalization  would  have  been  [politically]  radioactive”  just  months  earlier  (internal  citations  and  
quotation marks omitted)). 
 40. See, e.g., Simon Romero, Moving Clocks Ahead, Reaching Back in Time, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2007, at WK3 (discussing  the  scope  of  Venezuela’s  nationalizations  under  President  Hugo  
Chavez). 
 41. See, e.g., Terri L. Lilley, Note, Keeping   NAFTA   “Green”   for   Investors   and   the  
Environment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2002) (discussing how takings law tempers the force 
of nationalization by requiring compensation when the government takes property on behalf of the 
public). 
 42. See Higgs, supra note 36, at 547. 
 43. See Woellert & Gittelsohn, supra note 31. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are public– 
private hybrids due to their government mandate as mortgage market intermediaries. See Anca 
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this move as a nationalization.44 But the reality speaks for itself, as federal 
government officials decided the mortgage intermediary roles of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were too central to the stability of the housing sector 
to allow them to fail.45 There is no realistic possibility of redeeming the 
federal   government’s   investments   in   Fannie   Mae   and   Freddie   Mac.46 
However, politicians responded to political pressures and macroeconomic 
concerns about the stability of the housing loan industry by having the 
federal government assume direct liability and receivership control.47 
The federal government similarly nationalized General Motors (GM) 
on the ground that too many jobs were interconnected with the domestic 
automobile industry to let GM fail and go through a standard bankruptcy.48 
The  government’s infusion of $50 billion of capital into GM gave the 
government control and exposed the government to the potential for large-
                                                                                                                     
Bogdana Rusu, Rethinking Markets and Financial Institutions, 14 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 2 
(2008). However, the fact that they were publicly traded companies whose profits (and losses) 
presumably fell on their private sector owners establishes them as private firms for bailout purposes. 
Id.  
 44. See James B. Lockhart, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Announcement of 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 5–6 (Sept. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=23 (spinning the nationalization of Fannie 
Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  as  a  mere  “statutory  process  designed  to  stabilize  a  troubled  institution  with  
the objective of returning the entities   to   normal   business   operations”);;   see also Michael 
Abramowitz & Dan Eggen, Administration Decided in Late August that Takeover Was Needed, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at A08 (discussing how the Bush Administration framed the 
government takeovers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 45. See James B. Lockhart, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Speech to the 
National  Press  Club:  FHFA’s  First  Anniversary  and  the  Challenges  Ahead 14 (July 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14715/FHFA1stAnnSpeechandPPT73009.pdf (noting 
that “President  Obama  has  stated  clearly  his  Administration’s  intent  that  [Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  
Mac]  will  continue  to  play  a  key  role  in  helping  the  mortgage  market  recover”);;  see also Carrie S. 
Lavargna, Government-Sponsored   Enterprises   Are   “Too   Big   to  Fail”:  Balancing  Public   and  
Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991,  1014  (1993)  (predicting  correctly  that  “the  massive  size  of  
[Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac]  and  their  importance  to  other  financial  institutions  make  them  ‘too 
big  to  fail’”). 
 46. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1151, 1191 (2010) (discussing how the government has kept Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
“afloat”  through  massive  infusions  of  capital  that  it  is  unlikely to recoup). 
 47. See Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm 
Credit System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 58–60 (discussing how policymakers believed that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac provided essential secondary market facilities, ensuring that mortgage funding 
does not depend solely on cyclical markets). 
 48. For  example,  President  Obama  claimed  that  the  GM  and  Chrysler  bailout  “saved  more  
than  a  million  jobs.”  See Kate Andersen Brower & Nicholas Johnston, Obama Making Sales Pitch 
for Auto Bailouts to Skeptical Voters, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-07-30/obama-trumpeting-success-of-automaker-bailouts-to-skeptical-u-s-voters.html. 
Although General Motors formally went through a Chapter 11 reorganization to shed liabilities, 
nationalization by the federal government drove this process. See Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. 
Gouveia, What’s  Driving  Section  363  Sales  After  Chrysler  and  General  Motors?, 19 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 351, 362, 369 (2010).  
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scale losses,49 even though a significant portion of these monies was 
recouped   following  GM’s   government-overseen bankruptcy and initial 
public offering.50 Nonetheless, this initially open-ended financial 
commitment appeared to be driven by the political reality that automobile 
plants and jobs affected too many congressional districts for politicians to 
ignore  GM’s  plight,  rather  than  by assessments of financial viability.51 
Nationalizations and federalizations of liabilities are not limited to 
large  corporate  entities,  but  also  extend  to  the  government’s  assumption  of  
smaller, individual liabilities during crises. The classic case of 
federalization of smaller liabilities is the government response to 
catastrophe, such as floods, hurricanes, or terrorist attacks.52 The logic is 
that for small-impact events, parties need insurance coverage to be made 
whole. But if a catastrophe is large enough, then politicians may indulge 
the opportunity to grandstand and make everyone whole whether they were 
insured or not.53 For example, under government flood insurance, if a creek 
overflows, affected households will likely be eligible for payments only if 
the owners paid for government flood insurance. But if a river overflows, 
then  politicians’  cry  for  bailouts  generally  ensures  that  both  insured  and  
uninsured parties are made whole.54 The possibility that the government 
will assume the risk of liability therefore creates a moral hazard, deterring 
increasing numbers of those living by rivers from paying for flood 
insurance. There is little point of paying into a system if both insured and 
uninsured parties ultimately will receive the same payout.55 
                                                                                                                     
 49. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Chief Says G.M. Is Adapting Its Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, 
at B3 (discussing how 60% of General Motors was owned by the United States following the 
government’s  investment  of  $50  billion in the company). 
 50. See Nick Bunkley & Bill Vlasic, General Motors Files for an Initial Public Offering, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at B1 (noting that GM seeks to use the bailout money to lower the 
federal   government’s  ownership   stake   to  below  50% and   to   finance   the   company’s  continued 
overhaul).  
 51. See David E. Sanger & Jackie Calmes, President  to Promote Auto Bailout as a Success, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at B1 (detailing the Obama Administration’s   argument   that   the  
nationalization of General Motors was a success because only 279,000 automobile-related jobs have 
been lost and the toll on automakers and their suppliers would have been much greater without the 
government’s   intervention);;  John  Crawley,  Taxpayer Loss on Auto Bailout Narrows, REUTERS 
(June 1, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/02/us-usa-autos-treasury-
idUSTRE7505RJ20110602 (noting that government bailout loss estimates have fallen to less than 
20% and the U.S. Treasury has recovered approximately half of the loans made to GM and 
Chrysler). 
 52. See Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2526–32 (2003) 
(discussing federalization of private liabilities from terrorist attacks). 
 53. Id. at 2526–28 (discussing the role of problem construction in lobbying for federalization 
of catastrophic liabilities). 
 54. See Michelle Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 
GEO. L.J. 783, 784–85 (2005) (discussing how victims of cataclysmic losses will be compensated by 
the state or federal government whether or not they have insurance). 
 55. See Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the 
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The example of flood insurance underscores the moral hazards that are 
intrinsic to government intervention in assuming private sector liabilities. 
If individuals or corporations receive the upside of risk-taking, but can 
externalize the negative aspects of the risk onto the government, it invites 
excessive speculation. In a conventional insurance context, such as 
automobile insurance, risk-taking that causes accidents is factored into 
future premiums, so that drivers are forced to pay for their mistakes over 
time.56 In contrast, under nationalizations and federalizations, beneficiaries 
historically walk away without having to internalize the costs of 
government intervention in either an immediate or a prospective way.57 
In spite of the moral hazards posed by nationalizations and 
federalizations, nothing short of a constitutional amendment can formally 
constrain   politicians’   ability   to   prop   up   corporations   with   no   strings  
attached.58 Nonetheless, this Article argues that creating clear depoliticized 
channels and parameters for winding up and bailing out companies would 
make it more difficult for politicians to engage in corporate giveaways at 
the  public’s  expense. 
2.  FDIC Wind-Ups 
In nationalizations and federalizations, the federal government assumes 
the costs or liabilities of a company and generally faces the prospect of 
losses for the foreseeable future.59 Wind-ups represent the other end of the 
spectrum of government intervention: assumption of control of insolvent 
companies with the objective of selling the companies or liquidating their 
assets to minimize losses.60 While nationalizations and federalizations are 
ad hoc political decisions, the FDIC has provided a well-settled 
institutional framework for liquidating insolvent financial institutions in a 
swift, nonpolitical way.61 
While judicially supervised bankruptcies exist under Chapters 7 and 11 
                                                                                                                     
Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 449–50 (2003) (discussing the moral hazard posed 
by government compensation for insured and uninsured parties). 
 56. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 932–33 (1998) (discussing how insurance serves the valuable purpose of 
forcing the cost-internalization of damages). 
 57. Cf. Gron & Sykes, supra note 55, at 450.  
 58. See Adler, supra note 21, at 1209 n.334 (suggesting that only a constitutional amendment 
could  impose  limits  on  Congress’  spending  powers).  It  is  unclear  that  a  constitutional  amendment 
limiting federalizations or nationalizations would even be desirable, as extraordinary actions may be 
sometimes necessary to prop up the economy or systemically important companies. 
 59. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  
 60. See Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, at 868–69. 
 61. See id. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, such as the shotgun marriage between 
Merrill Lynch and Bank of America that then-Secretary of the Treasury John Snow brokered during 
the recent financial crisis. These exceptions are noteworthy for being anomalous deviations from the 
normal workings of the FDIC in winding up insolvent financial firms. See infra Subsection II.B.1.  
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of the Bankruptcy Code,62 the paradigm case for governmentally 
subsidized and administered bankruptcies are FDIC wind-ups of banks. In 
that instance, the FDIC administers a public insurance fund for winding up 
insolvent financial firms and faces a mandate of minimizing losses from 
bank failures.63 Wind-ups of insolvent firms generally occur at a net loss to 
the FDIC fund, which is covered by insurance premiums imposed on all 
FDIC-insured banks. If FDIC losses are significant enough to deplete its 
insurance fund, the FDIC can impose additional surcharges on FDIC-
insured banks to cover the difference.64 
The  FDIC’s  governing  principle  for  wind-ups is that it must pursue a 
“least-cost resolution”  in  liquidating  failed  banks,  that  is,  employing  means  
which cost the insurance fund the lowest in terms of losses.65 The trigger 
for  FDIC  action  is  generally  a  financial  institution’s  breach  of  FDIC  capital  
requirements, which raises concerns about  the  bank’s  solvency  or  suggests  
that  the  bank  is  in  “unsafe  or  unsound  condition.”66 If the FDIC examines 
the   institution   and   concludes   that   it   is   in   a   “severely   weakened  
condition,”67 the  FDIC  will   order   a   “capital   call”   and   issue   a   “prompt  
corrective action”  notice,  detailing  steps  the  bank  needs  to  take  to  restore  
its solvency.68 If the institution is unable to recapitalize or is still operating 
in an unsafe manner,69 the   FDIC   begins   to   implement   the   “least-cost 
resolution”  of  the  bank.70 While the FDIC has many resolution tools at its 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–07 (2006); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–16 (2006). 
 63. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006); see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.1 (2010). 
 64. For example, during the current crisis, shortfalls to the FDIC insurance fund led the FDIC 
to request advances on several years of FDIC insurance premiums totaling $45 billion. See Stephen 
Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments to Rescue F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A1. 
 65. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006); see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.1 (2010). 
 66. The FDIC has the authority to close financial institutions for numerous reasons, such as 
transacting business  in  “an  unsafe  or  unsound  condition,”  termination  of  deposit  insurance,  or  being  
convicted for money laundering offenses. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(C) (2006). The FDIC may also 
close  banks  because  of  “inadequate  corporate  governance,  weak  risk  management, and lack of risk 
diversification–lending  concentrations.” FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
OBSERVATIONS FROM FDIC OIG MATERIAL LOSS REVIEWS CONDUCTED 1993 THROUGH 2003, AUDIT 
REPORT NO. 04-004 II-1 (2004), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports04/04-004.pdf. 
 67. Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, at 870; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821 (c)(5)(L), 1831o(b) 
(2006). 
 68. See Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, at 870; see also Garten, supra note 9, at 476–77 
(discussing the development of prompt corrective action procedures).  
 69. The institution must recapitalize within ninety days of a notice for prompt corrective 
action,  although  the  FDIC  can  accelerate  this  time  frame  if  the  financial  institution’s  circumstances  
warrant a swift resolution. Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, at 870. 
 70. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 360.1 (2010). The FDIC or its primary 
regulator (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, or National 
Credit Union Administration) will  send  the  institution  a  “failing  bank  letter”  which  triggers  the  
FDIC’s  review  of  the  financial  institution  and  the  effort  to  resolve  the  bank’s  solvency  issues.  FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CO., FDIC RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 6–7 (1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html. 
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disposal,71 the FDIC generally sets up a bidding process for the failing 
bank and/or its deposits to other financial institutions in order to minimize 
losses.72 Once a bidder wins, the FDIC becomes the receiver of the bank, 
so that the FDIC can wind down the institution and resolve its liabilities.73  
During  the  financial  crisis,  the  FDIC  deviated  from  its  normal  “least  
cost”  resolution  mandate  and  instead  served  as  one  of  many  tools  of  the  
federal  government’s  ad  hoc  efforts.  The FDIC exercised its extraordinary 
authority  to  “take . . . action  or  provide  assistance”74 to  banks  to  “avoid  or  
mitigate”  any  “serious  adverse  effects  on  economic  conditions  or  financial  
stability.”75 For example, the FDIC steered bank bids to preferred buyers 
who received greater subsidies (such as the sale of Morgan Stanley to Bank 
of America) and let banks issue over $300 billion in FDIC-guaranteed 
bonds, which allowed banks to recapitalize at a much lower interest rate.76 
These actions stretched the role of the FDIC and blurred the distinction 
between  bailouts  and  the  FDIC’s  historic  wind-up role.    
The Dodd-Frank  Act  modifies  and  expands  the  FDIC’s  involvement  in  
winding up institutions whose failure would have “serious  adverse  effects  
on economic conditions  or  financial  stability.”77 While FDIC banks will 
continue to be covered under the FDIC insurance fund, the legislation 
creates  a  new  “orderly  liquidation  authority” (OLA) funded by the Treasury 
Department for winding up systemically important financial institutions 
                                                                                                                     
 71. The  FDIC’s  tools  include: “open  bank  assistance;;  conservatorship;;  creation  of  a  bridge  
bank or deposit insurance national bank; a purchase and assumption transaction with a healthy 
bank; an insured  deposit  transfer;;  and  a  depositor  payoff.”  See Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, 
at 875; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AN EXAMINER’S GUIDE TO 
PROBLEM BANK IDENTIFICATION, REHABILITATION, AND RESOLUTION 65–66 (2001). 
 72. The bidding process and due diligence for the winning bidder typically takes about thirty 
days. Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 9, at 872. 
 73. The FDIC generally closes the institution and dismisses its officers and directors. FDIC 
RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 70, at 70; 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)–(f) (2006). After the FDIC 
pays secured claims, the FDIC covers its administrative expenses as receiver and then pays in 
descending priority both insured and uninsured deposit liabilities, senior unsecured creditors, 
general unsecured creditors, and lastly, shareholder claims. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(10)–(11). While 
the FDIC alternatively may choose to act as a conservator and operate the institution as an ongoing 
concern, this option is rarely pursued. FDIC RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 70, at 69 n.2 
(1998). 
 74. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Before the FDIC can take extraordinary actions such as these, the Secretary of the 
Treasury must consult with the President and receive the approval by a two-thirds majority of the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  and  the  FDIC’s  Board  of  Directors. ROBERT S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. 
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 731–32 (4th ed. 
Wolters Kluwer 2009). 
 77. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).   
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that are not FDIC-insured.78  
The FDIC will intervene as a receiver for a covered financial 
company79 if: (1) the firm is in or is near default; 80 (2) its failure would 
“have  serious  adverse  effects  on  financial  stability”;;81 or (3) there is no 
private  sector  alternative  to  prevent   the  company’s  default.82 The OLA 
extends  the  FDIC’s  typical  resolution  authority  by  allowing  it  to  create  “a  
bridge  financial  company”;;83 engage in financing activities, but not assume 
equity stakes;84 appoint itself as the receiver for subsidiaries;85 engage the 
private sector to assist in the management and disposition of assets;86 and 
request assistance from and provide assistance to foreign financial 
authorities.87 In short, the FDIC enjoys sweeping powers to oversee the 
wind-up of firms related to the financial sector and to dispose of their 
assets. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201(a), 203(b), 210(n).  Potential SIFIs include a broad range of 
financial firms, such as bank holding companies, financial holding companies, nonbank financial 
companies supervised by the Federal Reserve or predominantly engaged in activities the Federal 
Reserve deems financial in nature, their subsidiaries, and SEC-registered brokers or dealers who are 
members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). However, insured depository 
institutions are not included under the OLA because insured depository institutions are already 
subject  to  the  FDIC’s  resolution  authority and procedures. Id. § 201(a)(7)–(9), (11). 
 79. In the case of SEC-registered brokers or dealers, SIPC will oversee the OLA procedures 
but will receive assistance from the FDIC, which also has the authority to fund a bridge financial 
company. Id. § 208. 
 80. Dodd-Frank defines “Default   or   in  Danger   of  Default”   to   include:   (1)   a  pending  or  
imminent filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code; (2) a likely incursion of losses that will 
significantly  diminish  or  eliminate  all  of  the  company’s  capital  and there is no prospect for the 
company   to   avoid   these   losses;;   (3)   the  assets  are   likely   to  be  “less   than   its  obligations   to”   its  
creditors; and (4) the company is or will be unable to honor its obligations. These provisions 
preempt submission to the typical bankruptcy procedures under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id. 
§ 203(c)(4). 
 81. The FDIC may also intervene if (1)  losses  to  the  company’s  creditors,  counterparties,  and  
shareholders would affect financial stability; (2) the use of the OLA, would be less harmful to the 
financial system and the U.S. taxpayer; (3) a federal regulator has ordered the company to convert 
convertible debt instruments; or, (4) the company is not an insured depository institution (though 
the company may have insured deposit-taking subsidiaries). Id. § 203(b). 
 82. When determining whether an institution will go through the OLA, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve or the FDIC (or the SEC for brokers or dealers), 
must recommend that the institution in question be liquidated and that the FDIC serve as the 
receiver. This recommendation must also be approved by a two-thirds majority vote by the Federal 
Reserve Board and the FDIC Board of Directors (or the SEC for brokers or dealers). Id. §§ 202(a), 
203. 
 83. Id. § 210(a)(1)(F).  This  mirrors  the  FDIC’s  pre-Dodd-Frank  Act  ability  to  create  a  “bridge  
bank”  for  faltering  institutions.  12  U.S.C.  § 1821(d)(2)(F) (2006). 
 84. H.R. 4173, §§ 204(d), 206, 210(b). 
 85. Id. § 210(a)(1)(E). 
 86. Id. § 210(a)(1)(L). 
 87. Id. § 210(a)(1)(N). 
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3.  The Challenges of Delineating Bailouts 
While the Dodd-Frank Act both expanded and more clearly delineated 
the  FDIC’s  role  in  winding  up  insolvent  companies,  Congress  has failed to 
create a parallel institution or framework for handling future bailouts. 
Bailouts form a middle ground of government intervention between 
nationalizations and wind-ups of companies. In nationalizations, the 
government takes complete control; in wind-ups, the government assumes 
control for a short time for the limited purpose of liquidating the 
company.88 In contrast, this Article argues that bailouts should be 
understood as investments in private companies to provide liquidity and 
stability during financial crises. Bailouts must be linked with investment 
returns  and  conditions,  both  to  cover  the  government’s  assumption  of  risk  
and to mitigate moral hazard. In bailouts, the government does not take 
direct managerial control of the company and only possesses a percentage 
of the debt or equity holdings of the company. The goal is to preserve 
beneficiaries as independent concerns and to mitigate the risk of future 
financial crises.89 
Bailouts constitute a spectrum of government aid to private companies 
that come with significant strings attached. In federalizations, the 
government assumes the liabilities of a faltering company without 
assuming any creditor status, managerial role, or any other conditions.90 
Bailouts share the same purpose of federalizations in strengthening the 
solvency and viability of private enterprises. But while federalizations 
constitute a form of direct subsidies or grants from the public to private 
sector, bailouts generally demand ultimate repayment of the principal and 
may be linked to a range of other quid pro quos for government 
assistance.91 Bailout conditions can be as simple as repaying the funds that 
the Federal Reserve offers a bank for emergency lending, along with a 
modest level of interest. Alternatively, bailouts may come with extensive 
strings attached, requiring corporate governance changes or compliance 
steps  designed  to  safeguard  the  government’s  investments  or  to  advance  
regulatory policy.92 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See supra Subsections II.A.1–2. 
 89. However,  as  politicians  note,  the  potential  for  bailouts  creates  the  choice  between  “either  
funding   a   bank   bailout   or   plunging   into   an   economic   crisis.”   Jake   Tapper  &   Jonathan  Karl,  
Financial Reform Bill: Can Democratic Legislation Prevent Future Bank Bailouts?, ABC NEWS 
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/financial-reform-bill-obama-prevent-bailouts-
republicans-disagree /story?id =10376893 (quoting President Barack Obama). 
 90. The classic cases of federalization  are  the  government’s  assumption  of  natural  disaster  or  
terrorist liabilities from private companies and individuals, where the federal government makes 
victims whole at no cost to them (if the disaster is large enough). See Manns, supra note 52, at 
2526–27. 
 91. See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. REG. 283, 301 (2010) (explaining that the government as a creditor may, at its 
discretion, impose limitations on bank operations). 
 92. See id. at 303. 
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Bailouts serve as a hybrid of stabilization, insurance, and investment. 
Both actual and potential bailouts have significant stabilization value for 
markets   and   individual   companies.   While   “too   big   to   fail”   was   a  
catchphrase throughout the recent crisis,93 the more significant concern 
was the degree of interconnectedness between financial and nonfinancial 
companies.94 The  specter  of  a  “domino  effect”—one  company’s  default  
catapulting its partners into failure—drove legislators to make capital 
infusions into a broad swath of the financial sector.95 The recent bailouts 
arguably succeeded in quelling the panic that was engulfing financial 
markets. Individual beneficiaries could point to bailout money as a vote of 
confidence in their continued viability.96 As importantly, the liquidity 
provided by the government allowed financial institutions to meet the 
demands of depositors without having to dramatically reduce lending and 
credit lines to other enterprises. While few members of the public have 
been pleased with the anemic economic recovery, the infusion of capital 
did serve an important stabilization  role  that  dampened  the  financial  crisis’  
impact.97   
Bailouts also function as de facto creditor insurance because of the 
strong likelihood of government intervention if there is a broad liquidity 
crisis. The rationale is that the impact of systemic risk events may be so 
significant that a federal backstop is necessary to reassure foreign and 
domestic investors about the viability of American debt and equity 
markets.98 Prospective beneficiaries, however, do not pay into a bailout 
insurance fund, along the lines of the FDIC for commercial banks, so there 
is no express assurance to debt or equity holders.99 Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See Marcelo Daboòs, Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey, in TOO BIG TO 
FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 141, 141–43 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004) 
(discussing  the  moral  hazard  caused  by  large  banks’  expectations of inevitable government support 
in a crisis). 
 94. See Brunnermeier et al., supra note 5,  at  24  (noting  that  there  are  some  “institutions . . . 
so large, so massively interconnected, and so iconic as ‘national  champions’  that  no  government  
would  ever  allow  them  to  fail”). 
 95. See Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses, and the Return of Unjust Gains, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 437, 437–38   (2009)   (observing   how   concerns   of   a   “cataclysmic   domino   effect”   drove  
policymakers to engage in bailouts). 
 96. See Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to  Buy  Stakes  in  Nation’s  Largest  Banks, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 14, 2008, at A1 (discussing how a primary purpose of bailouts is to restore investor 
confidence). 
 97. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 20, at 472–73 (acknowledging that some of the 
bailout  efforts  have  had  “stabilizing  effects”). 
 98. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 
47 DUKE L.J. 425, 475–76 n.225 (1997) (discussing how market participants may respond to 
systemic risk by sending their capital to other markets which could have destabilizing effects on the 
U.S. economy). 
 99. Some academics have proposed an insurance approach to address corporate failures 
across the board. See, e.g., Pederson & Roubini, supra note 5; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher 
Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management 
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potential for federal bailouts may significantly lower the cost of borrowing 
for companies, helping to stabilize the economy as a whole.  
The implied insurance and stabilization roles are the two rationales 
policymakers most frequently raise to support bailouts.100 The problem is 
that the pursuit of these two objectives by themselves may magnify moral 
hazards and dangers of overuse or abuse by government and corporate 
beneficiaries, who may seek to engage in greater risk-taking  at  the  public’s  
expense.  This  problem  is  heightened  further  by  the  federal  government’s  
“break  even”  approach  to  overall  bailout  interventions,  an approach that 
provides few disincentives against firms engaging in excessive leverage 
and risk-taking.101 In other words, the absence of a mandate for the 
government to seek long-term investment returns from bailouts not only 
shortchanges taxpayers, but also may undermine any deterrent effect for 
financial firms. If companies recognize that they can receive government 
aid if a financial crisis is large enough, they may be tempted to maximize 
risks (and profit potential) with the hope of externalizing losses to the 
government.102 
For this reason, the federal government needs an investor-oriented 
approach to temper the moral hazards from pursuing stabilization and 
insurance goals. A long-term investment approach for bailouts would serve 
a dual purpose: it would safeguard taxpayers’   interests   by   providing  
compensation  for  the  government’s  assumption  of  risk,  and  it  would  create  
disincentives  against  firms’  leveraging  potential  bailouts  to  engage  in  risk-
taking. Establishing investment-oriented conditions would ensure that 
beneficiaries receive the funding that they need during financial crises, yet 
are  deterred  from  dipping  too  early  or  too  far  into  the  government’s  well  
and transforming aid into a de facto hedge position. 
The  logic  behind  the  federal  government’s  role  as  an  investor during 
financial crises is that the government has a time horizon far longer than 
most investors and enjoys the wherewithal to borrow large sums at below-
market terms because of its taxing power.103 This fact creates an arbitrage 
                                                                                                                     
(Columbia L. and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 369, 2010), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1553880. But this Article argues that the deterrent value of an 
investor-oriented bailout is even stronger, in that companies would not be able to rely on the 
certainty of a bailout and would face more consequences if they received bailout funds. 
 100. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING TREASURY’S 
STRATEGY: SIX MONTHS OF TARP 25–26 (2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/ 
archive/cop/20110402034949/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-040709-report.pdf (detailing 
the  “unprecedented  set  of  steps  to  stabilize  the  financial  system”). 
 101. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
 102. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 210–11, 225 & n.198 (2008) 
(discussing how the possibility of a government safety net may magnify moral hazards for banks). 
 103. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1115, 1117–18 (2004) (discussing the advantages sovereign borrowers enjoy over 
private sector parties). 
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opportunity. Government investments can allow companies to bridge 
short-term financial gaps, yet face long-term repayment obligations that 
extend beyond the time horizon of a crisis. In the process, the federal 
government can expand overall liquidity through its investments by 
heightening market confidence. 
The dilemma the federal government faces in offering bailouts is 
determining how to price and condition aid. While there is a spectrum of 
options   at   the   government’s   disposal,   three   methods—federalization, 
“break   even,”   and   investment approaches—cover the ambit of major 
possibilities. The federalization of liabilities is the political temptress, as it 
epitomizes moral hazard in shifting liabilities from the private to public 
sector.104 Crises not only fuel financial overreactions, but also political 
panic.105 For  this  reason,  politicians’  first  instinct  may  be  for  aid  with  few  
strings  attached,  in  order  to  stimulate  the  economy  at  any  cost.  Politicians’  
primary constraint may be the fear of backlashes at giveaways to the 
private sector.106 
By   comparison,   the   federal   government’s   approach   of   seeking   to  
“break  even”  on  overall  bailout  investments  may  seem  to  be  an  alluring  
middle ground. By disavowing any motive other than stabilizing markets, 
the government may reassure market competitors and investors that the 
federal government does not intend to usurp their role. The challenge is 
that a break even approach ignores the significant risk exposure the 
government is assuming and, just as importantly, such an approach may 
have marginal deterrent effects, if any.107 If  the  “price”  of  excessive  risk-
taking is simply a loan on favorable terms, then banks have little to lose 
and much to gain by pushing the envelope with ever-bolder bets as they 
seek  to  leverage  the  government’s  superior  borrowing  power still further. 
In contrast, approaching bailouts as investments recognizes that 
government financing during crises potentially creates windfalls for the 
private sector and therefore may fuel moral hazard.108 By adopting an 
investment approach, the federal government can secure stabilization and 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See Boardman, supra note 54, at 784–85  (discussing  politicians’  temptations  to  federalize  
liabilities). 
 105. Memories   of   successful   economic   slogans   such   as   Bill   Clinton’s   mantra,   “It’s   the  
economy, stupid,”   likely   cast   shivers   down   the   spines   of   incumbent   politicians   and   make  
federalizations tempting. See, e.g., John Harwood, In Many Venues, Economy Will Take Center 
Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at A18. 
 106. See Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note  1  (discussing  Republicans’  response  to  the  bailout  
backlash). 
 107. See Lori Montgomery, TARP Expected to Cost U.S. Only $25 Billion, CBO Says, WASH. 
POST,  Nov.  30,  2010  (discussing  the  federal  government’s  “break  even”  objective  for  overall TARP 
investments,  although  noting  the  disconnect  between  the  TARP  losses  and  the  “substantial  financial  
risk”  the  U.S.  assumed  with  the  TARP  and  other  “massive  government  programs  aimed  at  propping  
up  the  financial  industry”). 
 108. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
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insurance goals, while still securing long-term returns for investors and 
deterring firms from overreliance on state financing. The challenge is 
pricing investments because during the depths of a crisis, the federal 
government may be a natural monopoly, serving as an investor of last 
resort. As such, the federal government could impose monopoly pricing 
that would compromise the stabilization and insurance purposes of 
bailouts. Instead, as Part III will explore in detail, the best limiting 
principle   for   government   investments  would  be   a   “proportional   share”  
approach that would link profit-sharing over a set time horizon to the 
government’s  percentage  contribution  to  company  capitalizations.109 This 
approach would ensure that beneficiaries share both risks and returns with 
taxpayers and create disincentives against overreliance on bailout funds 
and excessive risk-taking. 
II.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RECENT BAILOUTS 
While the federal government sought modest returns for individual 
bailout investments, there was no clear bailout paradigm, aside from 
stabilizing the financial system and coming as close to breaking even as 
possible.110 Part of the problem was that incoherence, ad hocery, and 
ambiguity   defined   the   government’s   initial responses to the financial 
crisis.111 Policymakers could not seem to make up their minds about 
whether to choose nationalizations, federalizations, wind-ups, or bailouts 
for faltering firms. In some cases, the government simply let private firms 
face the hard medicine of bankruptcy without government support, as was 
the case with the high-profile collapse of Lehman Brothers.112 In other 
cases, the government effectively nationalized failing companies, such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.113 
While FDIC wind-ups applied consistently to small and mid-size 
banks, the federal government breached the autonomy that the FDIC 
normally enjoys and engaged in a hodgepodge of interventions to support 
sales of large banks. For example, the Treasury Secretary offered 
assurances over the sales of Wachovia; other fire sales, such as Bear 
Stearns, enjoyed financial guarantees from the Federal Reserve.114  
                                                                                                                     
 109. See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
 110. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 20,  at  470  (noting  that  “it  was  hard  to  distill  a  consistent  
policy  rule  from  the  government’s  rescue  efforts,”  yet  arguing  that  “one guiding principle was its 
preference  to  avoid  all  possible  bankruptcy  filings”). 
 111. See Nocera, supra note 12,   at   9   (defending   the   Bush   and  Obama  Administrations’  
response to the financial crisis by arguing  that  “[w]hen  you  are  really  in  the  midst  of  a  crisis,  there  
is  no  plan.  You  have  to  take  actions  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  and  hope  for  the  best”). 
 112. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 20,   at   470.   “Private”   bankruptcy entails the use of 
government bankruptcy procedures and courts, but unlike FDIC bankruptcies, it does not entail 
government aid or direct intervention. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–07; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–16. 
 113. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 20, at 469–70, 491–92 n.117 (discussing the Treasury 
2011] BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS 1371 
 
A.  The Troubled Asset Relief Program 
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) sought to bring some 
clarity to the chaos by creating a framework for doling out $700 billion in 
bailout money.115 This approach represented a tentative step towards 
embracing an investor-oriented approach. But in practice the TARP was 
poorly designed as bank profits dwarfed the (at best) modest returns to 
taxpayers in the case of each beneficiary (and the overall losses).116 
The TARP was originally envisioned as a plan for the Treasury 
Department  to  purchase  or  insure  up  to  $700  billion  of  “troubled  assets.”  
These troubled assets included mortgages and related collateralized debt 
obligations (such as mortgage-backed  securities),  as  well  as  “any  other  
financial  instrument”  that  the  Treasury  Department  and  Federal  Reserve  
deemed  necessary  “to  promote  financial  market  stability.”117 The  TARP’s  
initial purpose was to enhance liquidity of collateralized debt obligations 
whose underlying mortgage portfolios had become suspect and disfavored 
by investors amidst the surge in foreclosures.118 In turn, the Treasury 
Department’s  purchases  of  these  assets  were  intended  to  help banks firm 
up their balance sheets and expand lending.119 
But this toxic asset purchase plan stumbled as a large-scale solution 
from the beginning because the Treasury Department lacked a guiding 
principle for making these investments.120 The dilemma was that 
                                                                                                                     
Department’s  and  Federal  Reserve’s  extraordinary  interventions in the wind-ups or emergency sales 
of many of the major banks and non-bank financial institutions during the crisis). 
 115. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Montgomery, supra note 107 (noting how 
the TARP program  constituted  a  “$700  billion  bailout  for  Wall  Street  titans”). 
 116. Compare Zachery Kouwe, Wall Street on Track for Record in Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2009, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/18wall.html (discussing 
anticipated bonuses of over $162 billion for the top six banks in 2009), with Montgomery, supra 
note 107 (discussing how the expected $25 billion in losses from TARP investments excludes the 
much  larger  losses  from  other  “massive  government  programs  aimed  at  propping up the financial 
industry”). 
 117. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 3(9)(A)–(B). 
 118. Id. § 2(a)(1). 
 119. The underlying logic of this approach is that the government could pay a premium for 
these assets over their market value because asset values would rise to reflect mortgage income 
streams once the financial crisis subsided. See Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 229. 
 120. The Treasury Department reversed course again on March 23, 2009 and revived a 
smaller-scale version of this program with the creation of the Legacy Securities Public-Private 
Investment Program. To date, this program has only $29.4 billion in financing (half of which is 
provided by the Treasury), which is being used to purchase mortgage-backed securities. Given that 
the dollar amount of mortgage-backed securities numbers in the trillions, it is a relative drop in the 
bucket   compared   to  TARP’s   initial   vision   for   purchasing   toxic   assets.   See U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, LEGACY SECURITIES PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROGRAM: PROGRAM UPDATE FOR 
QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
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purchasing mortgages and collateralized debt obligations at market value 
during   a   time   of   crisis   would   not   fix   banks’   balance   sheets,   while  
purchasing these assets at face value would constitute an extraordinary 
windfall for the financial sector and be a raw transfer from the public to 
private sector. While the federal government did engage in some purchases 
of collateralized debt obligations, such as $50 billion of AIG collateralized 
debt obligations,121 the  Bush  Administration  swiftly  moved  TARP’s  focus  
away from direct toxic asset purchases to preferred stock investments in 
banks under the Capital Purchase Program.122 
The logic behind preferred stock investments was that banks could 
count these monies towards their Tier 1 capital requirements for solvency, 
theoretically freeing up money for greater lending to the public.123 The 
Treasury’s  terms  were  exceptionally  generous,  with  dividend  rates  of  5%  
per year for the preferred stock for the first five years, well below the rates 
that financial institutions could secure on private markets during the depths 
of the crisis.124 Additionally, the Treasury Department required 
beneficiaries to issue equity warrants (options to purchase nonvoting 
shares).125 Each TARP beneficiary was required to issue ten-year warrants 
                                                                                                                     
financial-stability/programs/Credit%20Market%20Programs/ppip/Documents/External%20Report 
% 20-%2006-11%20vFinal.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LEGACY SECURITIES PUBLIC-
PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 9 (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/legacy_securities_faqs.pdf.  
 121. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Liam Pleven & Serena Ng, U.S. Throws New Lifeline to AIG, 
Scrapping Original Rescue Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A1 (documenting the $150 billion 
in government aid to AIG, which included $60 billion in loans, $40 billion in preferred stock, and 
$50 billion in purchases of distressed assets). 
 122. See Press   Release,   U.S.   Dep’t   of   the   Treasury,   Treasury Announces TARP Capital 
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx. The Bush Administration exploited the exception clause 
granting  discretion  to  purchase  “any  other  financial  instrument”  deemed  necessary  “to  promote  
financial  market  stability”  to  largely  abandon  the  initial  toxic  asset  purchase  plan.  See Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §§ 3(9)(A)–(B). 
 123. A number of commentators have shown that the purchase of preferred stock has done 
little to increase bank lending. See generally Linus Wilson, Debt Overhang and Bank Bailouts 
(Sept. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1336288 (arguing that infusions of capital through preferred stock have little impact on 
bank lending and less effect than other alternatives, such as the purchase of toxic assets). 
 124. Press Release, TARP Capital Purchase Program, Senior Preferred Stock and Warrants: 
Summary of Senior Preferred Terms 2, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Documents/document5hp1207.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). While   the   preferred   stock’s  
dividends would rise to 9% after five years, this provision was moot, as the Capital Purchase 
Program was designed to incentivize banks either to pay off their obligations by this point or to 
convert the investment to equity shares. Id. 
 125. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t  of  the  Treasury,  Treasury  Announces  Warrant  Repurchase  
and Disposition Process for the Capital Purchase Program (June 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/200962612255225533.aspx. 
Private banks could alternatively issue equivalent equity or senior debt instruments. Id. 
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that totaled 15% of the TARP investment, divided by the exercise price 
(which  was  the  average  of  the  beneficiaries’  stock  price  prior  to  receipt  of  
TARP monies).126 In theory, the Treasury Department could redeem its 
investment by purchasing common stock at prices fixed at the time of its 
investment, so that it could reap returns from potential stock 
appreciation.127                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The warrant approach was designed to give the Treasury Department 
some degree of exposure to the upside of recovering banks, as it was clear 
to all observers that the 5% dividend yield bore no relation to the degree of 
the  government’s  assumption  of  risk.128 Unfortunately, the devil is in the 
details in two ways. First, the fact that the warrants reflected only 15% of 
the value of TARP investments placed significant limits on the 
government’s  exposure  to  the  potential  upside  of  a  recovery.129 Second, the 
ten-year warrants proved to be an illusory time frame. Instead, the 
government effectively gave beneficiaries the option of when to redeem the 
warrants and preferred stock once the economy stabilized. In practice, that 
meant that the banks had every incentive and opportunity to cash out the 
government’s   warrants   at   a   low   stock   price   once   they   could   secure  
financing  from  the  private  sector.  As  a  result,  the  Treasury  Department’s  
foray into investing was cut short for most of the major bank beneficiaries.  
Instead managers and shareholders reaped the returns from a surging stock 
market within a year of the TARP investments.130 
1.  The Case of Goldman Sachs 
Goldman   Sachs’   handling   of   TARP   and   related   bailout   monies  
underscores the degree of opportunism by beneficiaries and the modest 
returns   on   the   government’s   investments.  Goldman  Sachs   transformed  
itself overnight from a barely regulated investment bank into a more 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Id. 
 127. Banks with more than $500 million in assets were limited to issuing preferred stock to the 
Treasury Department equal to 3% of their risk-based capital. Banks with $500 million or less in 
assets could issue preferred stock to the Treasury Department equal to 5% of their risk-based capital 
and only had to issue warrants to cover 3% of their risk-based capital. See Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  
of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) for 
Small Banks, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/investment-
programs/cpp/Documents/FAQonCPPforsmallbanks.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 128. Jon Hilsenrath, Bailouts Yield Returns Amid Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2009, at A10, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125176287995474339.html. 
 129. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
ASSESSING TREASURY’S PROCESS TO SELL WARRANTS RECEIVED FROM TARP RECIPIENTS 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/Assessing Treasury’s Process to Sell 
Warrants Received From TARP Recipients_May_11_2010.pdf. 
 130. David Mildenberg, U.S. TARP Warrant Plan Favors Banks, Professor Says, BLOOMBERG 
(July 1, 2009, 10:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDdsEXq 
94Pw0.  
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regulated bank holding company, in order to be eligible for bailout 
monies.131 Goldman Sachs received a direct infusion of $10 billion in 
TARP money during the lowest depths of the economic crisis, money that 
not only stabilized its balance sheets but also was a vote of confidence to 
equity   markets   concerning   Goldman   Sachs’   continued   viability.132 As 
significantly, Goldman Sachs was the counterparty to a significant 
percentage   of  AIG’s  derivative   contracts   and   received  $12.9  billion  of  
AIG’s   bailout   monies,   as   well   as   billions   more   from   other   TARP  
recipients.133 In addition to the TARP aid, Goldman Sachs was allowed to 
issue $29 billion of FDIC-guaranteed bonds, letting the company raise 
money far more cheaply than it could have on its own.134 But for over $50 
billion in bailout-related  funds,  Goldman  Sachs’  liability  exposure  during  
the depths of the crisis could have toppled the company, which meant its 
continued   viability   was   largely   due   to   the   federal   government’s  
intervention.135 
The   redemption   of   Goldman   Sachs’   preferred   stock   and   warrants  
underscores how little the United States reaped, given the significant extent 
of  its  assumption  of  risk  (and  Goldman  Sachs’  literal  and  metaphorical  
debt to the government). In October 2008, the Treasury Department gave 
Goldman Sachs $10 billion in TARP monies,136 in exchange for $10 
billion of cumulative preferred stock with a 5% annual dividend rate for 
the first five years, as well as ten-year warrants to purchase up to 12.2 
million shares of common Goldman Sachs stock at an exercise price of 
$122.90 per share.137 
From October 28, 2008 to July 22, 2009, Goldman Sachs paid the 5% 
interest owed on the preferred stock, totaling $318 million.138 Then on July 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 625 (2010) (discussing how Goldman   Sachs’   and  Morgan   Stanley’s  
conversion to bank holding companies allowed them to access funds on favorable terms from the 
Federal  Reserve’s  discount  window). 
 132. See U.S. SEC, Form 10-K: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 180, available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/10k/docs/2008-10k-doc.pdf. 
 133. See Paritosh Bansal, Goldman’s  Share  of  AIG  Bailout  Money  Draws  Fire, REUTERS, Mar. 
18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52H0B520090318. 
 134. See Andrew Bary, How Do  You  Spell  Sweet  Deal?  For  Banks,  It’s  TLGP, BARRON’S, 
Apr. 20, 2009, http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124001886675331247.html#articleTabs_panel 
_article%3D1. 
 135. See David Leonhardt, Heading Off the Next Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, 
at MM36   (discussing   how   “Goldman   and   Morgan   Stanley   might   not   have   survived   without  
government  aid”). 
 136. See U.S. SEC, Form 10-K: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 179–80, available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/10k/docs/2008-10k-doc.pdf. 
 137. The warrant total is calculated by dividing 15% of the $10 billion of TARP investments 
(that is, $1.5 billion) by the average Goldman Sachs share price of $122.90 per share during the 
twenty-day period prior to receipt of TARP funds. See id. at 129. 
 138. Goldman Sachs Pays $1.1 Billion to Redeem Warrants, CNBC.COM (July 22, 2009, 5:20 
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22, 2009 (less than nine months after the investment), Goldman Sachs 
redeemed the warrants for $1.1 billion, which the Congressional Oversight 
Panel deemed was within the $925 million to $1.25 billion value of the 
warrants at that time.139 The 23% annualized return on the TARP money 
looks impressive at first glance. The problem is that when one begins to 
break down the numbers and determine how much the early redemption by 
Goldman Sachs cost taxpayers, the degree of shortchanging becomes clear. 
All one must do is examine the contemporaneous purchase of $5 
billion   in   Goldman   Sachs’   preferred   stock   and   warrants   by   Warren  
Buffett’s  Berkshire  Hathaway  to  understand  how  an  investor  would  have 
approached  this  same  investment.  Warren  Buffett’s  September  23,  2008  
investment in Goldman Sachs secured 10% dividends on preferred stock, 
twice the level of dividends that the federal government secured.140 Buffett 
also secured five-year warrants that would allow Berkshire Hathaway to 
convert its $5 billion investment into the equivalent of $5 billion of 
common stock priced on the day of his initial investment ($115 per 
share).141 What this means is that if Warren Buffett had converted his 
preferred shares on the same day as the federal government (July 22, 
2009), he would have reaped $2.7 billion in returns, plus an additional 
$357.5 million in dividends over that time. In other words, Warren 
Buffett’s  investment  yielded  more  than  double the rate of return of the 
federal government, even though he was assuming the same level of risk. 
By  the  time  Goldman  Sachs  redeemed  Warren  Buffett’s  preferred  shares  in  
March of 2011, Buffett had paper profits of $3.7 billion on a $5 billion 
investment, a 74% return that dwarfed  the  federal  government’s  now  more  
modest-appearing returns.142 Of course, because Buffett is acting as a long-
term investor, he has retained his common stock warrants, as he wisely 
recognized that Goldman Sachs may have more potential upside in the 
years to come. 
It is safe to say the executives of Goldman Sachs understood this logic 
when  they  cashed  out  the  United  States’  TARP  shares  well  before  the  full  
                                                                                                                     
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/32085262/Goldman_Sachs_Pays_1_1_Billion_to_Redeem_Warra 
nts.  
 139. See Goldman  Sachs  Warrant  Price  “Right  On”—Watchdog, REUTERS (July 22, 2009, 
4:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT01149320090722 (referencing Congressional 
Oversight  Committee  Chair  Elizabeth  Warren’s  opinion  that  the  Goldman  Sachs  warrants  were  
purchased at a fair price). 
 140. See Alex Crippen, Warren Buffett’s  Goldman   Sachs  Warrants   Rebound   from  Deep  
Losses, CNBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/29860039/ Warren_Buffett_s_Go 
ldman_Sachs_ Warrants _Rebound_ From_Deep_Losses. 
 141. See Susanne Craig, Matthew Karnitschnig & Aaron Lucchetti, Buffett to Invest $5 Billion 
in Goldman, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122220798359168765.html#printMode. 
 142. See Andrew Frye, Buffett Generates $3.7 Billion on 2008 Goldman Sachs Investment, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
18/buffett-generates-3-7-billion-from-goldman-investment-made-during-crisis.html. 
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recovery of the stock price.143 Goldman  Sachs’  earnings  and  compensation  
to employees totaled almost $30 billion in 2009, consisting of $16.2 billion 
in employee compensation and bonuses (an increase of 37% from the 
previous year), as well as near-record profits of $13.39 billion.144 From this 
vantage point, the returns on the TARP investment in Goldman Sachs 
seem  very  slight  relative  to  the  significance  of  the  Treasury  Department’s  
injection of capital. The reward for helping Goldman Sachs bridge the 
depths of the crisis was a premature payout that left Goldman Sachs 
executives to reap the returns from the Treasury  Department’s  risk-taking. 
To add insult to injury, Goldman Sachs held onto FDIC-backed loans 
of $29 billion issued under the Temporary Loan Guarantee Program.145  
This means that Goldman Sachs has literally continued to profit from an 
implicit government subsidy (of lower borrowing costs of at least 2%), 
translating into even more free profit to $700 million per year. Similarly, 
Goldman Sachs never paid a penny to the Treasury for the TARP funds it 
indirectly received through TARP bailouts of AIG and other financial 
institutions that owed Goldman Sachs funds.146 Even these monies pale in 
comparison to the value of the implicit government backstop, which allows 
Goldman Sachs to maintain a leverage ratio of 20:1, a level the market 
likely would not tolerate but for faith in future government bailouts.147 The 
bottom line is that Goldman Sachs has profited, and will continue to profit, 
from explicit and implicit government subsidies. It would not be difficult 
to tailor future bailouts in order to provide taxpayers with a greater 
percentage of the return attributable to government intervention and, in the 
process, to provide firms with deterrence against excessive risk-taking. 
While Goldman Sachs deserves some blame, most of the fault for the 
poorly planned and executed bailouts rests with the federal government. 
The federal government failed to secure warrants that reflected the scale of 
significance of its investments, as warrants covered a meager $1.5 billion 
of the bailout aid.148 By allowing Goldman Sachs to redeem the warrants 
early  at  the  time  of  Goldman  Sachs’  choosing,  the  federal  government  let  
                                                                                                                     
 143. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Treasury to Auction Off Big-Bank Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/business/20bank.html (estimating 
that if the federal government had held onto the Goldman Sachs warrants for another four months 
and benefited from the stock rise, the government would have almost doubled its investment and 
received upwards of $2.1 billion, rather than the $1.1 billion it received in July 2009). 
 144. See Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Goldman Sachs Earns $13 Billion in 2009, WASH. POST, Jan. 
22, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/21/ 
AR2010012101044.html. 
 145. See Bary, supra note 134. 
 146. See Mark Pittman, Goldman,  Merrill  Collect  Billions  After  Fed’s  AIG  Bailout  Loans, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 29, 2008, 12:41 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=new 
sarchive&sid=aTzTYtlNHSG8. 
 147. See Bary, supra note 134. 
 148. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
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most of the rewards serve as a windfall for Goldman Sachs executives and 
investors. The returns would have been even more substantial if the federal 
government sought warrants for the more than $50 billion that directly and 
indirectly  flowed  to  Goldman  Sachs  through  the  government’s  bailout  of  
AIG and other financial institutions and FDIC-backed loans. Instead, the 
government stood by while Goldman Sachs executives reaped enormous 
profits  at  the  public’s  expense  and  celebrated  the  taxpayers’  billion  dollars  
of actual returns. It is little wonder that bailouts have become a virtually 
pejorative term for shortchanging taxpayers and failing to provide 
deterrence against future financial risk-taking. 
B.  Assessing the True Costs of Bailouts 
Goldman  Sachs’  substantial  benefit  from  government  aid  is  only  one  
slice of the larger bailouts, and it is worthwhile to underscore the true costs 
of the bailouts. Defenders of the TARP point to the $25 billion in losses 
from TARP investments to argue that the bailouts were not poorly run and 
that losses were less than anticipated.149 TARP proponents also point to the 
fact that banks have not only repaid $276 billion in loans, but have also 
paid $45.8 billion in dividends on preferred stock investments, $1.4 billion 
in interest on loans, and $9 billion in proceeds from warrants, as evidence 
that the federal government has received returns for its $475 billion in 
TARP investments.150 There is some truth to this claim, as direct subsidies 
(and losses) from public transfers to the financial sector could have been 
more substantial, and the swift recovery of asset and equity prices 
mitigated this loss exposure. 
But this analysis overlooks a deeper truth. Bailouts to banks were only 
part of a much larger set of multitrillion dollar transfers from the public to 
the private sector to address the financial crisis that almost doubled the 
national debt in a span of three years.151 Part of this story was the 
nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a move that has set up the 
United States as the express backstop for $5.14 trillion in mortgage-backed 
securities and guarantees, $148 billion in direct bailout aid, and upwards of 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See Montgomery, supra note 107 (discussing how the expected $25 billion in losses from 
TARP  investments  excludes  the  much  larger  losses  from  other  “massive government programs 
aimed  at  propping  up  the  financial  industry”);;  see also Deborah Solomon, Light at the End of the 
Bailout Tunnel, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at C1 (noting a higher figure of $89 billion in projected 
TARP losses, but also observing that these losses do not include losses from Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and other forms of support for housing and financial markets). 
 150. These returns are based on $475 billion in direct investments of TARP money. See PRO 
PUBLICA, WHERE IS THE MONEY? EYE ON THE BAILOUT, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/ 
main/summary (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 151. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A FISCAL CRISIS 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11659/07-27_Debt_FiscalCrisis_Brief.pdf 
(noting that the federal debt held by the public rose from 36% of GDP in 2007 to 62% of GDP in 
2010). 
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$1 trillion in potential losses.152 Another part of the story is the stimulus 
package of $790 billion153 and related stimulus measures totaling an 
additional $399 billion,154 which were designed to spur demand and revive 
the economy from the financial crisis (and substantially added to the 
national debt). 
An equally important part of the story is the shadow bailout that 
indirectly benefited financial institutions. The Federal Reserve has 
committed $6.4 trillion to an array of initiatives to prop up the economy 
and has, to date, made $1.5 trillion of actual expenditures.155 The most 
significant of these efforts is the $775.6 billion in purchases of mortgage-
backed securities held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, $295.3 billion of 
U.S. government bond purchases, and $109.5 billion in loans to banks 
backed by toxic assets.156 Other aspects of the shadow bailout include the 
$308.4 billion of FDIC-guaranteed bank loans under the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program and the $45.4 billion that the FDIC has lost 
on bank bailouts.157 
While the ultimate tally of losses remains to be seen, it is clear that the 
financial crisis cost taxpayers immense sums.158 The true cost of bailouts 
will not be known for years to come due to its impact in exacerbating an 
already spiraling national debt. It may be unrealistic for financial 
institutions to shoulder all of the losses that taxpayers face and ironically 
thwart the stabilizing purpose of bailouts in siphoning off funds for 
lending.   But   the   government’s   approach   to   bailouts   meant   that   the  
government faced substantial risks and losses at a time when TARP 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 31.  The  Congressional  Budget  Office’s  debt  numbers  
do not include the nationalization of Fannie Mae and  Freddie  Mac’s  debt  and  the  IOU’s  that  the  
federal government owes to the Social Security and Medicare Trust funds. Inclusion of these figures 
would place debt levels much higher. See id. at 2–3; Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, 
Mortgage Giants Agreeable to Rescue Plan, but Its Cost Is Unknown, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at 
A27. 
 153. See Shailagh Murray & Paul Kane, Congress Reaches Stimulus Accord, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 12, 2009 (documenting the cost and rationale for the main stimulus package). 
 154. Additional stimulus packages include the $168 billion spent on the Economic Stimulus 
Act of 2008, $8 billion in unemployment benefit extensions, $195 billion for student loan 
guarantees, $25 billion for the Advanced Technology Manufacturing program, and $3 billion for the 
“Cash   for  Clunkers”  Car  Allowance  Rebate  System.  See David Goldman, CNNMONEY.COM’S 
BAILOUT TRACKER, http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.; see also Edmund L. Andrews & David E. Sanger, U.S. Is Finding Its Role in Business 
Hard to Unwind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/ 
14/business/14big.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the scale and role of the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program in the bailouts). 
 158. As importantly, the financial strain on the government may make it more difficult for the 
government to repeat its current approach of borrowing immense sums at low interest rates when 
future financial crises arise. See Hill, supra note 47, at 76 n.540. 
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beneficiaries went from life support to reaping exceptional profits from the 
bailouts and related government interventions. 
1.  The Costs of Ad Hocery 
The  costs  of  the  government’s  bailout  extend  well  beyond  dollars  and  
cents.  Another  “cost”  of   the  program  was   the   loss  of   legitimacy  of  the  
bailout method because of the shifting, ad hoc nature of these bailouts. 
This Article has focused on the Capital Purchase Program of TARP 
because this initiative has modest investment features that are relevant to 
this   proposal’s   investor-oriented approach. But the Capital Purchase 
Program was only one of a dizzying range of TARP-financed bailout 
programs that the federal government embraced. For example, the 
Systemically Significant Financial Institutions Program (in spite of its 
seemingly broad nature) was a tailor-made bailout whose sole purpose was 
financing  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York’s  purchases  of  AIG’s  
toxic assets.159 Other narrowly designed TARP initiatives included the 
Targeted   Investment   Program,  which  was   “targeted”   towards   covering  
Bank  of  America’s  potential  losses  from  its  Treasury  Department-brokered 
purchase of Merrill Lynch,160 and the Auto Supplier Support Program, 
which was created solely to nationalize General Motors and to provide 
financing  for  Fiat’s  takeover  of  Chrysler.161 These TARP programs were 
soon complemented by a myriad of other initiatives: to purchase asset-
backed securities consisting of student, automobile, credit card, and small 
business loans;162 to make loans to small businesses;163 to make loans to 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THIRD TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–2 (2008), 
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/TrancheReports/TrancheReport3a.pdf (detailing 
the rationale for creating a specially tailored bailout program for AIG); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 971–72 (2009) (discussing the financing and 
transactions for the AIG bailout). 
 160. See Press Release, Federal Reserve, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide 
Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/20090116a.htm  (discussing  how  this  program  covered  Bank  of  America’s  
losses that stemmed from the acquisition of Merrill Lynch). 
 161. Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  the  Treasury,  Treasury  Announces  Auto  Supplier  Support  
Program (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Pages/tg64.aspx; Anna Malik, U.S. to Sell Remaining 6 Percent Stake in Chrysler to Fiat, NEWS 
RICKEY, June 3, 2011, http://news.rickey.org/u-s-to-sell-remaining-6-percent-stake-in-chrysler-to-
fiat/4528; see also George W. Bush, Remarks on the American Auto Industry: December 19, 2008, 
GPO ACCESS 1568, 1569 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v44no50.html 
(discussing  President  Bush’s  rationale  in  unilaterally  extending  TARP  funds  to  automakers). 
 162. See Anh P. Nguyen & Carl E. Enomoto, The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, 7 J. BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH 91, 94 (2009) (discussing the 
creation and contours of the Troubled Asset Loan Facility). 
 163. See Elizabeth Williamson, Obama Rolls Out Small Business Lending Program, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704022804575040722955784 
294.html (discussing the creation of the $30 billion Small Business Lending Program, which was 
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community development banks;164 and to restructure underwater 
mortgages.165 
This byzantine system of bailouts was tailor-made for giving 
sweetheart deals to favored companies and made oversight and 
accountability more difficult.166 It is little wonder that much of the public 
was left disillusioned about bailouts when so many companies and sectors 
of the economy had their own special bailouts and distinctive terms. This 
type of policymaking on the fly is prone to panicked overreactions, as well 
as opportunism, abuse, and capture by beneficiaries. Because both 
beneficiaries and policymakers faced no clear guidelines as to where TARP 
monies could extend next, it was easier for policymakers to push the 
bounds of bailouts and to scale back conditions on bailout monies. The 
absence of a clear bailout framework also encouraged companies to 
pressure politicians into having bailouts extend to previously uncovered 
risks such as credit derivatives, a problem the specially tailored bailout for 
AIG underscored.167 The myriad of specially tailored bailouts raised the 
moral hazards for future bailouts, as companies may have greater 
incentives to magnify risk-taking to ensure that a debacle in their economic 
sector will capture the government’s  attention. 
Ad hoc bailouts also sharpened conflicts of interests among banking 
regulators.  For  example,  the  expansion  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  lending  
window into a de facto bailout fund during the early stages of the crisis 
placed the Federal Reserve in the contradictory position of propping up the 
                                                                                                                     
funded with TARP money). 
 164. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM, MONTHLY 105(A) 
REPORT, 14–15 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-
room/reports/105/Documents105/March%202010%20105%28a%29%20monthly%20report_fin 
al.pdf (discussing the creation of the Community Development Capital Initiative announced in 
October 2009). 
 165. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: UPDATED DETAILED 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 3–5 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/housing_fact_sheet.pdf.  
 166. The Dodd-Frank Act specifically  limits  the  Federal  Reserve’s  ability  to  make  emergency  
loans to an individual company unless it is part of a program with broad-based eligibility. See 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a)(2), 
124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343). The rationale for this limit is to 
guard  against  politically  driven  favoritism  in  the  Federal  Reserve’s  short-term lending through its 
discount window. The FGIC proposal would be partly consistent with this Federal Reserve 
limitation.  Companies  would  need  to  meet  the  FGIC’s  capital  requirements  for  eligibility  for  the  
broad-based program of bailout aid. However, the FGIC would enjoy discretion to tailor the terms 
of  the  bailout  program  to  the  company’s particular circumstances and the overall economic context 
as part of its long-term investment approach. While this discretion would deviate from the 
limitations the Federal Reserve now faces, other safeguards this proposal lays out to establish the 
independence of the FGIC would seek to diminish the risk of politically driven favoritism in future 
bailouts. See id. 
 167. See Sjostrom, supra note 159, at 963–69, 979 (discussing how AIG successfully lobbied 
for  specially  tailored  bailouts  of  its  derivatives’  losses). 
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financial institutions that it was supposed to regulate. Similar problems 
arose from the large-scale use of FDIC-backed bonds and the Treasury 
Department’s   TARP   loans   during   later   stages   of   the   crisis.   Having 
regulators simultaneously serve as lenders of last resort meant that 
regulatory mandates were likely to be subordinated or suspended in the 
process. Banking regulators failed to implement the prompt, corrective 
action requirements for financial institutions whose capital fell below 
required thresholds.168 The absence of a clear bailout framework that 
delineated between regulatory and bailout roles made it easy for regulators 
to let their bailout roles supersede their primary responsibilities. 
Lastly, ad hocery produced bailout relief without consequences. The 
federal government failed to tie bailout monies to significant changes on 
the part of the financial industry, and the modest conditions attached to 
TARP monies fell away as soon as the preferred stock and warrants were 
cashed out.169 This fact meant that the government not only missed the 
chance to impose stronger conditions ex ante, but also gave up whatever 
leverage it had before it attempted substantive reforms.170 For example, the 
TARP legislation imposed limits on executive pay and even allowed 
clawbacks to be imposed on bonuses.171 But these populist measures had 
little effect, as banks simply steered bonuses into stock options.172 Once 
TARP beneficiaries repaid their bonuses, the Treasury Department lacked 
the leverage and the political will to use clawbacks on the $1.6 billion in 
bonuses that it deemed illegitimate.173 Ironically, the financial institution 
executives who steered their firms to the brink of financial ruin cashed in 
on   the   stock   market’s   surge   following   the   government’s   large-scale 
intervention, while the government reaped little for its own massive 
assumption of risk and failed to exercise the recoupment tools it had.174 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 1070–71 (2010). 
 169. See David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 467 & n.159 (2010) (discussing how Goldman Sachs and other banks 
eagerly repaid their TARP monies to escape TARP conditions and scrutiny from federal 
regulators). 
 170. See Eric Dash, 10 Large Banks Allowed to Exit U.S. Aid Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2009, at A1 (lamenting the fact that the Obama Administration had failed to impose reforms on 
banks as a condition of loans and was allowing banks out of the TARP without having implemented 
substantive reforms).  
 171. Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 232 
n.184 (2011). 
 172. See Jim Puzzanghera & Nathaniel Popper, Pay  Czar  Assails  Bankers’  Bonuses, L.A. 
TIMES, July 24, 2010, at A1. 
 173. See id. (noting that Pay Czar Kenneth R. Feinberg criticized seventeen banks for giving 
excessive bonuses, but failed to exercise his powers to order a bonus clawback). 
 174. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating  Bankers’  Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 
272–73 (2010) (arguing that TARP pay arrangements tying executive compensation to common 
1382 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
The  limits  of  the  government’s  ad  hocery  underscore  the  desirability  of 
clearer institutional approach. 
C.  The Shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act: The Bailout Gap 
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act sought to address the systemic 
risks that lay at the roots of the financial crisis in a number of ways, such 
as by imposing limits   on   banks’   proprietary   trading   and   heightening  
oversight of derivatives transactions.175 But  the  bill  created  a  “bailout  gap”  
by failing to create a comprehensive framework for government financial 
intervention in the (likely) event reforms fail to preempt future crises.176 To 
Congress’s  credit,  the  Dodd-Frank Act has made the circumstances and 
scope for FDIC wind-ups   clearer   by   expanding   the   FDIC’s   role   in  
liquidating insolvent financial companies.177 Creating a broader framework 
for the swift liquidation of insolvent institutions is a step of progress that 
reduces uncertainties about this facet of financial crisis management. 
However, Congress failed to address the need for an institutional 
framework to handle future bailouts and left a haze of uncertainty about 
how future bailouts would be addressed. This fact means that, at best, an ad 
hoc framework exists for dealing with financial and non-financial 
companies that need financing during future crises. This omission casts a 
shadow of significant unknowns over the marketplace as companies have 
been left with a wait-and-see approach towards what future cases may 
require government intervention short of a winding down of the firm. 
Policymakers may simply be so optimistic about the efficacy of 
reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act that they believe there will be no need for 
future bailouts.178 But more realistically, a majority in Congress has made 
the calculation that expressly acknowledging and addressing the need for 
bailouts would expose them to populist anger in the short term, and they 
would prefer to defer this difficult problem for future Congresses to 
handle.179 The unfortunate truth is that our country may not be able to 
                                                                                                                     
stock appreciation created incentives for bank executives to return TARP monies and cash in their 
profits). 
 175. See Nathaniel Popper & Walter Hamilton, Financial Reform  Package  Wouldn’t  Change  
Wall Street Much, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at 1. 
 176. See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 105 (2010) (discussing how 
the Dodd-Frank Act sought to prevent future bailouts of financial institutions). 
 177. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384) 
(delineating the FDIC’s  criteria  for  winding  up  systemically  important  companies). 
 178. See Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010, at 
A01 (discussing the faith that Dodd-Frank places in regulatory changes and the preemptive 
detection of problems). 
 179. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 543, 573–74 (2007) (discussing problems created by rules allowing Congress to 
delay dealing with the resolution of public policy issues). 
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shoulder another crisis like the one it has recently undergone without a 
clear blueprint for addressing and resolving bailouts because of the 
staggering costs involved and the huge stakes for the economy and the 
national debt.180 While wind-ups provide a way to deal with insolvent 
corporations, policymakers need to have a framework in place for 
otherwise solvent corporations that need capital injections to survive. 
III.  THE CASE FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING AN INVESTOR OF LAST RESORT 
Congress’  implicit  approach  to  planning  for  bailouts  has  been  to  advise  
companies  to  “mind  the  gap”  in  the  financial  system  during future crises.181 
Companies face uncertainty concerning whether they could secure public 
or private financing when the private sector faces another liquidity crisis. 
As a result, companies still have perverse incentives to take on larger size 
and risks, so that the impact of their defaults would be so destabilizing to 
the economy that the federal government would have little choice but to 
bail them out. But the irony is that financing gaps may affect even fiscally 
responsible companies. The recent financial crisis underscored how swiftly 
otherwise solvent companies can come to the brink of failure due to a 
nationwide credit squeeze or liquidity crisis (triggered by their more 
reckless peers). The price of filling that gap through last-minute fixes may 
be far too costly—by either leaving out firms that merit aid or in having 
desperation bailouts that throw money at beneficiaries so quickly that 
opportunism abounds.182 
A.  A Blueprint for the Federal Government Investment Corporation 
The role of investor of last resort for the government is designed to 
overcome this gap by institutionalizing a credible commitment to handle 
bailouts in a structured way. The FGIC would seek to depoliticize bailouts 
by vesting authority for bailouts in an independent agency whose role in 
investing   in   distressed   companies   would   parallel   the   FDIC’s   role   in  
winding up insolvent firms.183 The FGIC would seek to provide taxpayers 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See, e.g., NICOLETTA BATINI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: 
SELECTED ISSUES PAPER, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 10/248 54 (2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10248.pdf   (noting   that   “closing   the   fiscal   gap 
requires  a  permanent  annual  fiscal  adjustment  equal  to  about  14  percent  of  U.S.  GDP”  and  raising  
questions  about  the  United  States’  ability  to  sustain  funding  of  such  large-scale government deficits 
in the long run). 
 181. Just as subway systems advise passengers  to  “mind  the  gap,”  the  onus  is  on  companies  to  
avoid falling through the cracks of the financial system during a crisis. 
 182. See Levitin, supra note 24, at 499–501 (discussing the implications of false negatives and 
positives on the efficacy of bailouts). 
 183. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611–15 (2010) (laying out the merits of independent 
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with long-term returns commensurate with the risks they assume in 
offering financing to systemically important companies and to deter 
companies from over-reliance on government aid in the process. 
The irony is that the federal government did take tentative steps 
towards creating an investor of last resort role during the recent crisis 
through the TARP.184 If policymakers were candid with the American 
public, they would acknowledge that the recent bailouts transformed the 
federal government into a sovereign wealth fund (or perhaps a more apt 
term,  given  the  U.S.’s  degree  of  public  indebtedness:  a  sovereign  “debt”  
fund), “boasting”  a  pool  of  un(der)regulated  capital  with  vast  holdings.185 
Making this role explicit by institutionalizing and delineating its contours 
would provide greater clarity and direction for financial markets.186 
The  FGIC’s  existence  would  entail  vesting  significant discretion in an 
independent  agency.  It  would  be  naïve  to  think  that  a  “one  size  fits  all”  
approach to bailouts would work, so policymakers would need to give the 
FGIC discretion concerning whether to invest and how to tailor the terms 
of investment, while laying out guidelines and principles to temper this 
discretion. 
1.  Crafting an Investor Paradigm for the FGIC 
While the virtues of creating an institutional framework for handling 
bailouts may be clear, it may be harder to persuade policymakers of the 
merits of an investor paradigm. After all, the guiding principle of the FDIC 
is to minimize costs for each bank failure and to break even overall while 
handling wind-ups.187 Similar  “break  even”  approaches  apply  to  both  the  
Federal  Reserve’s  emergency lending to banks and TARP loans from the 
Treasury Department.188 The  government’s  oft-raised claims of coming 
                                                                                                                     
agencies).  
 184. See infra Section II.A. 
 185. See infra Subsection III.D.3. 
 186. The FGIC would build not only on the experiences of sovereign wealth funds in other 
countries, but also on significant precedents of independent federal institutions. The federal 
government has embarked on two other distinctive experiments: the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), each of which operated failed 
companies as going concerns for periods of time. See, e.g., GARY SHORTER, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS—THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 2–5 (2008) (discussing 
the  RTC’s  role  in  winding  down  failed  banks  over  a  multiyear  time  horizon);;  Walker  F.  Todd,  
History of and Rationales for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 28 ECON. REV. 22, 23–27 
(1992) (discussing the history of the RFC). 
 187. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006); see also 12 C.F.R. § 360.1 (2010) (laying out the 
FDIC’s  break-even mandate). 
 188. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 134 
(2008) (mandating that the TARP break even within five years of its enactment or that the Treasury 
Department impose a surcharge on the financial industry). 
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close to breaking even on certain portions of the TARP investments 
underscore the fact that this has been the guiding principle for bailouts, as 
well.189 
Just as significantly, the question remains as to what an investor 
paradigm would look like for the FGIC. As the investor of last resort, the 
FGIC would effectively serve as an equivalent of a monopoly or natural 
monopoly (since it would act as a bridge financier for distressed companies 
when the market was no longer able or willing to do so).190 As a 
monopolist, the investor of last resort could extract extraordinarily high 
prices for its financing services.191 For example, if the federal government 
had acted as a profit-maximizing investor during the recent financial crisis, 
it could have easily taken over most of the American financial industry at 
its nadir at fire sale prices.192 That outcome would have effectively 
conflated the role of bailouts with nationalization of the banking industry 
and  undercut  the  bailouts’  purpose  of  supporting  the  independent  viability  
of systemically important companies. 
2.  The Natural Monopoly Analogy 
One potential way to preserve yet temper an investor paradigm would 
be to treat an investor of last resort agency like a natural monopoly by 
using rate regulation.193 Natural monopolies in contexts such as water or 
electricity provision could charge prohibitively high rates to consumers if 
unconstrained by regulatory oversight.194 These entities are generally 
monopolists in a given area because of the prohibitive cost of building a 
parallel distribution system.195 To address this risk, natural monopolies 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See Solomon, supra note 149. 
 190. Natural monopolies exist in contexts where only one company can cost-effectively 
provide services. The classic case is water, a context in which it would be prohibitively expensive to 
have two parallel sets of pipes to carry the water to houses. See Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and 
Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 
1138–39. In the investor-of-last-resort context, the concept is that no entity other than the 
government may be in a position to provide financing. 
 191. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–16 (1982). As discussed later in 
Part III, one other check on the investor of last resort would be the risk that politicians would 
nationalize or federalize the problem through direct legislation to take over a prospective 
beneficiary. 
 192. See Klein, supra note 39, at 656–67. 
 193. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 363  (6th  ed.  2003)  (“The  
law’s  traditional  answer  to  the  problem  of  natural  monopoly  was  public  utility  or  common  carrier  
regulation.”). 
 194. See William Michael Treanor, Supreme Neglect of Text and History, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1059, 1061 (2009) (discussing how even libertarians recognize that rate regulation is permissible in 
the natural monopoly context to the extent there is market failure preventing competitive prices). 
 195. See ALFRED E. KAHN, 2 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 
123 (1971)  (describing  a  natural  monopoly  as  a  context  in  which  “one  company  can  serve  any  given  
number of subscribers . . . at  lower  cost  than  two” (emphasis omitted)); Lincoln L. Davies, Power 
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must secure state agency consent for setting rates and therefore can only 
pursue reasonable rates of return rather than profit maximization.196 The 
problem of applying rate regulation to the FGIC is that such a system 
would be difficult to administer and time consuming, running counter to 
the need for swift investment in companies to resolve crises. As 
importantly, rate regulation oversight may introduce significant 
politicization to bailouts.197 The investor of last resort would always be at 
the mercy of rate regulators who would face industry pressure to keep rates 
of return artificially low and/or to steer investments towards politically 
connected groups. 
3.  The Proportional Share Approach to Investing 
The limits of rate regulation suggest the virtue of establishing a clearer, 
easily administrable principle to shape the investment decisions for the 
investor of last resort. The most straightforward way to temper the 
government’s   monopoly   power,   while   securing   an   investment   return,  
would  be  to  implement  a  “proportional  share”  principle  for  government  
investments in distressed companies. The FGIC would receive convertible 
preferred stock with a value that is proportional to the distressed 
company’s  overall  capitalization.198 In other words, if a company has a 
market capitalization of $50 billion and the investor of last resort invests 
$25 billion, then the federal government should receive convertible 
preferred shares with a value that is one-third of the outstanding stock. The 
virtue of preferred stock is that the investment would have both equity and 
debt dimensions and a set time horizon. Convertible preferred stock would 
have priority over ordinary shareholders for any distributions,199 and this 
stock would have a multiyear time frame in which the federal government 
alone would have the option of converting it to common stock (and reaping 
the returns of an economic rebound). To avoid excessive entanglement of 
                                                                                                                     
Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1347–48 (2010) (discussing 
electric  utilities  acquiring   the   role  of   ‘natural  monopoly’  due   to   the  cost  of  building  a  second  
parallel electrical system). 
 196. See Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither 
the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 34–35 (2000) (laying out the rationale for rate regulation of 
natural monopolies). 
 197. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 
450 (2002) (discussing how rate regulation  is  a  “politically  charged”  process). 
 198. This approach contrasts significantly with the TARP warrants covering only 15% of the 
value  of  the  Treasury  Department’s  preferred  stock  purchases.  See Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  the  
Treasury, Treasury Announces Warrant Repurchase and Disposition Process for the Capital 
Purchase Program (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/200962612255225533.aspx. 
 199. See Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions 
in Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 144 & n.81 (2005) (discussing convertible 
preferred  stock’s  priority  in  bankruptcy). 
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the investor of last resort in the private sector, investments should be 
limited to 50% of the equity value of any recipient.200 
The proportional share approach represents a middle ground for 
guiding a government investment paradigm. First, it would limit the 
FGIC’s   ability   to   secure   monopoly   prices   for   its   investments   without  
subjecting the process to slow and (potentially) politicized rate regulation. 
Second, this approach would limit the FGIC’s  ability  to  play  favorites  and  
to impose different financial demands for investments based on the 
influence of a given company. The fact that the proportional share would 
be linked to the equity stake at the time of investment (or at the time news 
leaks about an industry bailout, to avoid an artificial surge in the equity 
price) would mean that the market would have already factored in the 
relative risk of a given company into its stock price.201 The potential for 
government investment may artificially prop up equity prices (even during 
the height of the market).202 Nonetheless, markets would reflect the risk 
factors facing a given company, and the proportional share principle would 
mitigate risks of sweetheart deals for politically connected corporations. 
Third, it is worth stressing that each marginal government dollar would 
be worth far more to the company than earlier equity or debt investments 
of equal value in the company. Because government investments would 
occur during periods when credit would come at a high price if it is 
available at all, the government would be in a position to demand a much 
higher premium than the proportional profit share. Lastly, the existence of 
an investor of last resort would create tremendous leverage. The markets 
would understandably view noninvestment by the investor of last resort as 
a vote of no confidence in the viability of a troubled company. That means 
that the federal agency would otherwise have leverage to dictate terms, 
unless it faced the proportional share constraint or other substantive limits. 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Privately held companies would not have as clear a benchmark for determining the 
proportional share because of the absence of publicly traded stock. However, establishing a 
proximate market value for these companies would be a straightforward, though more costly, task, 
which is routinely conducted for firm valuation in the mergers and acquisitions context. See Wulf 
A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 585–86 (2009). 
 201. This approach is analogous to the valuation timing for assessing the value for takings of 
real property. Under well-settled law, the timing for determining the market value of seized property 
in a given area is when the plan is made for a government project (or when news of that plan leaks), 
even if a particular parcel has not been selected for purchase at that time. This approach is designed 
to ensure that private parties do not reap a windfall from speculative investments concerning the 
seizure of land or the benefits from a given government investment. See, e.g., United States v. 
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374–79 (1943). 
 202. Cf. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1390–91  (2006)  (explaining  that  “liquidation  protection”  serves  as  a  
“valuable   device”   which   “provide[s]   additional   protection to the going-concern value of a 
business”). 
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B.  Principles for Establishing a Bailout Framework 
The proportional share approach would establish the investment lens 
(and limits) for the investor of last resort. However, it is equally important 
to delineate who will be potentially bailed out, to what degree, and with 
what consequences. This Article lays out three principles to guide bailouts: 
(1) deterrence of prospective beneficiaries by reducing the stakes of 
managers, shareholders, and creditors, (2) alignment of interests with the 
FGIC   for   recouping   the   government’s   investment,   and   (3)   linkage   of  
corporate governance and systemic risk reforms to bailout investments. 
1.  Deterrence of Each Level of Stakeholder to Mitigate Moral Hazard 
The key to designing bailouts is deterrence, in order to mitigate moral 
hazard and overreliance on government funds. Bailouts will always be a 
possibility in an extreme crisis, but they must come with a significant 
impact on all levels of stakeholders to make government intervention a last 
resort. For this reason, managers, shareholders, and creditors must face 
reductions in their stakes as a quid pro quo for government aid, so that no 
stakeholders would have an interest in prematurely pushing for bailout 
assistance. 
Transforming bailouts into long-term investments would implicitly 
impact managers and shareholders by diluting their stakes in proportion to 
the  government’s  investment,  but  creditors  would  not  be  directly  affected.  
Thus, the sticking point to ensure shared sacrifice would be reductions of 
creditors’  stakes.203 Bailouts during the current crisis were remarkably pro-
creditor.204 Creditors emerged largely unscathed in most instances of 
government intervention—with a few notable exceptions, such as the 
nationalization of General Motors.205 However, tying reductions in 
creditors’  stakes  to  bailouts  is  not  unprecedented  (outside  of  bankruptcy,  
where   reductions   to   creditors’   stakes   are   the   norm).   For   example,   the  
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation routinely exacts this type of quid 
                                                                                                                     
 203. The bipartisan bias in favor of creditors may reflect fears about the effect of defaults on 
the trillions of dollars of public and private indebtedness owed to foreign creditors. While the 
potential for reductions  of  creditors’  stakes  may  deter  some  creditors  (even  in  an  environment  where  
confidence in other major debt markets, such as the European Union, has been shaken), 
bankruptcies would likely impose far deeper cuts on creditors. Additionally, creating a system of 
greater predictability for bailouts may mitigate concerns about bailout-related losses by 
safeguarding  a  greater  percentage  of  creditors’  investments. 
 204. See Hill, supra note 47, at 57 (observing that  the  Treasury  Department’s  bailout  strategy  
of   taking   preferred   stock   and   warrants   for   common   stock   served   to   preserve   bondholders’  
investments). 
 205. See, e.g., Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 31, at 488–89 (discussing  the  government’s  logic  
in protecting the $5.14 trillion in mortgage-backed securities that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had 
outstanding because of concerns about the reactions of foreign investors who held a significant 
percentage of this debt). 
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pro quo on beneficiaries of corporate pensions.206 
Reductions   to   creditors’   stakes   could   be   accomplished   through   a  
number of different means. The simplest approach would be a direct 
reduction in their holdings, analogous to the bankruptcy treatment for 
creditors, in which creditors would recoup a set percentage less of their 
investments as a condition for a bailout. Reductions could be accomplished 
through more indirect means, such as postponement of payments to 
creditors (as they lose the time value of money). Alternatively,  creditors’  
interests could be diluted, based on the scale of government investment and 
priority for government investments in bankruptcy. Imposing uniform 
reductions   to   stakeholders’   interests   would   provide   a   clear   signal   to  
corporate stakeholders of the tradeoffs for bailouts. However, it may make 
the most sense to give the FGIC discretion to tailor the particular 
combination of direct cuts, deferral, and dilution to the beneficiary at 
issue.207 For example, a bailout beneficiary with large amounts of short-
term debt may require a different approach than a beneficiary burdened 
with debt with longer maturities. Similarly, the FGIC can condition the 
degree  of  reduction  of  creditors’  interests  to  the  speed,  sustainability,  and  
degree of recovery, so that stakeholders and the FGIC benefit from a swift 
and lasting rebound. 
2.  Alignment of Interests with the FGIC 
Second, the FGIC would seek to align the interests of bailout 
beneficiaries with the FGIC to ensure that the government reaps the returns 
of its investments. The FGIC would tie taxpayer returns to the long-term 
returns of bailout stakeholders to ensure that taxpayers reap returns that are 
proportional to their investments. The federal government did receive 
modest returns on dividends and warrant sales from some TARP 
investments that partly offset significant overall losses.208 However, the 
                                                                                                                     
 206. The PBGC automatically imposes cuts on pension beneficiaries who receive benefits 
above a set maximum when it takes over pensions from ailing corporations. See Richard L. Kaplan, 
Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 57 (2004); see also 
Disclosure to Participants; Benefits Payable in Terminated Single-Employer Plans, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,470 (Dec. 2, 2002) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 4011, 4022) (setting a cap of approximately 
$3,600 in monthly pension benefits covered by the PBGC). 
 207. One  issue  that  arose  during  the  recent  bailout  was  that  the  TARP  program’s  one-size-fits-
all approach to repayment may have squeezed smaller banks with less access to capital to repay 
their loans. Empowering the FGIC to tailor bailout packages to the circumstances of beneficiaries 
may temper this concern. See Daniel Wagner, Small Banks Struggling Despite Bailouts, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 14, 2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38240491/ 
ns/business-small_business/t/small-banks-struggling-despite-bailouts/ (discussing the limitations of 
the “one size fits all” bailout approach used for TARP monies). 
 208. TARP recipients have paid $45.8 billion in dividends on preferred stock investments and 
$1.4 billion in interest on loans. The federal government has also received $9 billion from warrant 
sales. See PRO PUBLICA, THE STATE OF THE BAILOUT, http://bailout.propublica.org/main/summary 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
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government  gave  in  to  beneficiaries’  pressure  for  early  redemptions,  which  
allowed beneficiaries to pay off the investments well before their stock 
prices recovered. As a result, the federal government bore almost all of the 
risk in capitalizing banks and stabilizing nonfinancial companies during 
the peak of the crisis. Nonetheless, early redemptions left corporate 
managers and other stakeholders with nearly all of the profits.209 While the 
early redemptions were a sign of success in stabilizing financial markets, 
they also underscored how poorly designed and executed the bailouts were 
in  failing  to  uphold  taxpayers’  financial  interests. 
This approach of shortchanging taxpayers should change for future 
bailouts. Instead of a short-term time horizon, the FGIC would be able to 
lock in its investments for up to a five-year period and would be able to 
engage in gradual draw-downs of its investments at its discretion. Not 
every crisis will progress from the depths of near collapse back to a 
semblance of normalcy as quickly as the recent crisis did, and these time 
parameters will provide flexibility to deal with a more extended crisis. 
Additionally, the five-year period for government stakes is designed to 
provide the FGIC with adequate time to reap the true returns for its 
assumption of risk, while guarding against a permanent, creeping 
transformation of the economy. 
This approach would also seek to use interconnectedness for a 
productive purpose.210 Locking   in   the  government’s   stake   in   corporate  
beneficiaries over a five-year time horizon would impose limits and 
oversight on managers, as well as equity and debt holders. For example, 
during the recent crisis, managers at Goldman Sachs and other bailout 
beneficiaries  slipped  out  of  the  TARP  executive  pay  “handcuffs”  as  soon  
as possible, and months later doled out record bonuses to themselves.211 
Strangely enough, Goldman Sachs and other major banks were happy to 
hold onto their hundreds of billions of dollars of FDIC-backed bonds, 
which came with no strings attached and allowed them to secure credit on 
favorable terms.212 
If the federal government had remained a significant stakeholder in 
Goldman Sachs and other beneficiaries, the government would have 
potentially had a proportional share in profits arising from the bailouts and 
would have limited the private windfall from public support. There is no 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
 210. Throughout the crisis, interconnections have been correctly blamed for magnifying 
systemic risks. See Brunnermeier et al., supra note 5, at 25. Interconnecting the financial fates of the 
FGIC and corporate beneficiaries is designed to do the opposite by making it more difficult for 
formerly distressed companies to go back to their wayward ways. 
 211. See Tse, supra note 144. 
 212. See Monthly Reports Related to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: Term at 
Issuance of Debt Instruments Outstanding, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/type_term07-10.html (documenting that over $292 
billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt is still outstanding). 
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reason why the federal government should not share in proportional returns 
for up to a five-year period, even after the beneficiaries have paid their 
loans  to  limit  windfalls,  if  the  government’s  aid  made  that  revenue  stream  
possible. A related point is that by interconnecting the FGIC with 
beneficiaries, it may allow the FGIC to tailor the ultimate reduction in 
stakeholders’  stakes  to  companies’  success  in  turning  their  fortunes  around. 
3.  Linkage of Bailouts to Corporate Governance and Systemic Risk 
Reform 
The third facet of bailout reform would entail linking bailout aid to 
corporate governance and systemic risk reform. One of the problems of 
bailouts is that government dollars swooped in to the save the day, but the 
aid did little to change the underlying incentives of financial and 
nonfinancial entities to take destabilizing risks (so long as they follow large 
enough herds). The paradox of the current approach to bailouts is that, by 
serving as stabilizers, they removed the sense of political and economic 
urgency to regulatory reform. Even worse, the stabilizers empowered the 
perpetrators of excessive risk taking to leverage their windfall profits to 
lobby and stymie reform.213 
Because bailouts undercut pressure for reform, the FGIC should make 
substantive reforms a condition of bailouts up front, at the time when the 
government’s  leverage is at its peak. For example, it was clear before the 
bailouts that vast, undisclosed over-the-counter derivative liability 
exposure had magnified systemic risks in the financial sector.214 The 
financial reform bill dealt with this issue in a watered-down way that will 
do little to change the inner workings of banks or their systemic risk 
exposure. For example, the controversial Lincoln Amendment to the Dodd-
Frank Act will eventually require banks to relocate derivative trading 
outside of the FDIC-insured banking operations, but allows firms to keep 
derivatives trading within the bank holding company.215 This fact means 
that bank holding companies can still indirectly leverage FDIC-guaranteed 
funds for their derivatives operations. This approach also does little to 
change  the  likelihood  of  government  intervention  if  a  major  derivatives’  
participant faces a risk of default.216 
                                                                                                                     
 213. See Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2010, at A01 (discussing how banks have responded to the aftermath of the financial crisis 
by hiring legions of lobbyists and financial regulation lawyers). 
 214. See Baker, supra note 14, at 1349–50. 
 215. See Edward Wyatt, For Securities Industry, Finance Law Could Bring New Light to 
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at B7. 
 216. The legislation formally bars federal assistance to swaps entities. However, the legislation 
carves out an important exception, which allows banks to receive federal assistance if the 
derivatives business is separately incorporated, yet under the same bank holding company umbrella. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305). 
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The irony is that it would have been simple during the financial crisis 
to require each bank receiving aid to divest its derivative and proprietary 
trading operations completely (even if, for the sake of stability, the date for 
divestment was delayed until after the crisis subsided). Economic crises 
generally do not sneak up out of nowhere, and the current crisis was no 
exception, as numerous government and academic observers had 
documented the roots of systemic risks before the crisis reached its climax 
in late 2008 and early 2009.217 Given the awareness of the problems, the 
FGIC would have been in an ideal position to impose systemic risk 
exposure changes as a quid pro quo for aid. 
Bailout conditions that are designed to mitigate systemic risks would 
seek to address externalities of excessive risk-taking. Another 
complementary condition would be to enhance internal monitoring of risk-
taking by requiring beneficiaries to seat truly independent directors on their 
boards. Many academics have commented on the sham of independent 
directors being hand-selected by existing boards and failing to play any 
significant oversight role.218 For this reason, the FGIC could require 
beneficiaries to have independent directors selected by an outside body in 
proportion  to  the  stake  of  the  FGIC’s  investment.  Having  an  independent  
body   appoint   the   directors   would   formally   separate   the   government’s  
financial and managerial roles and thus mitigate entanglement between the 
government and beneficiaries. But it would also ensure that beneficiaries 
face more meaningful internal scrutiny to help reduce the likelihood of a 
repeat of their financial overstretch. This approach may be particularly 
significant for financial firms, as true outsiders may be less likely to be 
drawn into the conventional wisdom of risk-taking that enveloped the 
industry during the run-up to the financial crisis. 
4.  A Boom-Time Role for a Crisis Agency 
One legitimate question about the FGIC is what the agency would be 
doing during prosperous times when the need for bailouts was a distant 
prospect. The vice and virtue of the existing ad hoc system of bailouts has 
been that regulators could shift hats from their regulatory mode to focus on 
bailouts when crises arise. In theory, agencies could leverage their 
regulatory expertise and make a smoother and more rapid transition from 
                                                                                                                     
 217. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Securities Litigation and the Housing Market 
Downturn, 35 J. CORP. L. 97, 106–08 (2009) (providing an overview of when academics and 
policymakers began to recognize the root causes of the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 218. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin 
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610–15 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of creating an adversarial 
atmosphere among a group of corporate directors by introducing an outside director); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874–76 (1991) (discussing the potential problems of relying on 
outside directors); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 903 (1996) (same). 
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intervention to propping up the financial sector.219 
The problem is that simultaneously wearing regulatory and bailout hats 
raises an inherent conflict of interest. During a crisis, the Federal Reserve 
and other regulators will face strong incentives to systematically 
subordinate their regulatory role in favor of bailouts.220 That is what 
happened during the current crisis, as enforcement of longstanding rules 
gave way to ad hocery solutions.221 The moral hazard inherent in this 
approach is that when enforcement of regulatory constraints may matter the 
most to mitigate the scope of financial overstretch, rules may instead be 
marginalized by conflicting mandates. As a result, industry players will 
have less incentive to respect regulatory constraints even during boom 
times because of confidence that rules will be rolled back when the boom 
goes bust. 
To avoid this conflict of interest, the FGIC would not have a direct 
regulatory mandate that would potentially conflict with its bailout role. 
Overseeing long-term bailout investments would mean that a core staff 
would have ongoing responsibilities monitoring bailout beneficiaries, even 
at the height of the economic cycle. If the FGIC were self-funded (a 
possibility discussed in Section III.D.), its personnel would also manage 
the   agency’s   investment   portfolio   to   ensure   that   the   fund  met   its   own  
liquidity guidelines.222 But even these roles would likely be insufficient in 
both  ensuring  that  the  FGIC’s  core  staff  would  be  gainfully  occupied  and  
keeping their skills in assessing financial risks sharp so that they would be 
ready to intervene during future bailouts. 
For this reason, it would be important for the FGIC to have a 
complementary   “peace-time”   function   that  would   strengthen  skills   and  
understanding of financial markets without rising to the level of a 
conflicting regulatory role. One role the FGIC could play is to serve as a 
watchdog in monitoring both industry and regulators. The FGIC could 
assess the health of the financial sector, identify weaknesses and stressors, 
and make recommendations to regulators about how to address gaps in the 
system.223 This approach would ensure that the FGIC is constantly 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for 
Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 462–63 
(2009)  (discussing  the  virtue  of  integrating  regulators’  monitoring  role  with  the  ability  to  intervene  
to support faltering companies). 
 220. Regulators may also wish to avoid admitting regulatory failure and therefore hold off on 
intervention until the cost to the taxpayers will be dramatically higher. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies 
Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 822 (2011). 
 221. See Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2009) 
(arguing   that   “suspending   regulations”   to   contain   the   crisis   was   “neither good, nor bad, but 
unavoidable”). 
 222. See infra Subsection III.D.1. 
 223. This role would complement the vision for the Financial Services Oversight Council and 
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generating the type of information it would need in order to make informed 
decisions about bailouts on short notice. 
This   “think   tank”   role   would   also   support   the   FGIC’s   function   in  
leveraging bailouts to require beneficiaries to implement financial reforms. 
Congress and regulators grappled only with forward-looking reforms after 
bailouts had stabilized the banking industry and put banks in a position to 
stymie significant changes.224 In contrast, the FGIC could serve as both a 
watchdog and policy incubator, so that reform ideas could be considered 
and debated at an earlier point. This approach would potentially enable the 
FGIC to implement reforms during the course of the bailout process when 
the government’s  potential  influence  would  be  at  its  peak.  Policymakers  
could thereby avoid the predictable pitfall that occurred during the current 
crisis when reforms quickly fell to the wayside as bailouts replenished 
banks’  strength.225 
One related problem is how FGIC staffing would work, as it would 
likely need to grow quickly in the midst of future economic crises. The 
FDIC offers an example of how accordion-like an agency can be in having 
a core staff expand to meet greater need for its services. For example, 
FDIC employment grew 80% from 2007 to 2010 in response to their 
expanded crisis role—from approximately 4,500 employees in 2007 to 
8,150 employees in 2010.226 The FGIC could similarly grow from a smaller 
core staff in response to future crises. While crises frequently hit a peak 
during a rapid period of strain to the financial system, the gathering storm 
of risk factors often take much longer to coalesce,227 giving the FGIC time 
to gradually build its staffing strength. 
C.  The Need to Impose Limits on the FGIC 
While it is important for the FGIC to exercise independence and 
discretion in investment decisions, part of the appeal of institutionalizing 
an investor of last resort is the ability to impose limits on its discretion to 
                                                                                                                     
provide another set of eyes within the government examining and making recommendations about 
potential systemic risk concerns. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of 
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 627–30 (2010) (discussing the role of collaborative 
relationships under the plan for the Financial Services Oversight Council). 
 224. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) 
(discussing  how  “[f]inancial  regulation  is  often  reactive”). 
 225. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y. 
TIMES,  June  26,  2010,  at  A01  (discussing  the  financial  industry’s  effective  lobbying  to  undercut  the  
Dodd-Frank Act and its regulatory implementation). 
 226. See FDIC Statistics at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
statistical/stats/2011mar/fdic.html (last updated May 24, 2011). 
227.      See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 (2009) (discussing the factors that ultimately led to the financial crisis of 
2008). 
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guard against government overstretch.228 One concern is that FGIC 
investments could lead to excessive entanglement between the public and 
private sector. Even during the best economic periods, there are companies 
which need financing that the market will not provide because of the 
companies’  poor  prospects. During a liquidity crisis, such a wide spectrum 
of companies may seek aid that the FGIC could be overwhelmed both in 
terms of handling the volume of requests and in its financial wherewithal. 
Creating too expansive a role for the FGIC as an investor of last resort may 
cause the FGIC to overextend itself by propping up companies that are not 
competitive or by taking on so many investments that it cannot effectively 
screen the investment-worthiness of companies. For this reason, the FGIC 
would need to have a clear, yet limited mandate to provide financing to 
firms whose insolvency would heighten systemic risks. 
Policymakers debated the contours of what constitutes systemic risk 
throughout the financial crisis in order to determine when government 
intervention was needed.229 Most definitions of systemic risk center on 
default risk that would adversely impact the broader economy, although the 
lack of a precise definition of systemic risk suggests the need to give 
regulatory agencies flexibility in determining and addressing such dire 
circumstances.230 Understandings of systemic risk range from 
“something . . . that is a good deal bigger and worse than the failure of any 
single   institution”231 to   “significant   losses   to   financial   institutions   or  
substantial financial-market   price   volatility”232 to an entity whose 
“failure . . . to meet its obligations to creditors and customers would have 
significant adverse consequences for the financial system and the broader 
economy.”233 However, no clear consensus exists concerning what degree 
of adverse impact constitutes systemic risk.234 
                                                                                                                     
 228. In contrast, it may be far harder to oversee ad hoc bailouts because they are designed on 
the fly and may evolve quickly. See Dombalagian, supra note 18, at 835–36 (discussing the danger 
of ad hoc oversight  and  limits  becoming  “window  dressing”). 
 229. See Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 194–95.  
 230. Id. at 196–97. 
 231. Darryll Hendricks, Defining Systemic Risk 1 (Pew Econ.  Pol’y  Dep’t:  Fin.  Ref.  Project,  
Briefing Paper No. 1, 2009). 
 232. Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 198. 
 233. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 75 (2009) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, 
Member, Federal Reserve Board of Governors). 
 234. For example, some policymakers argue that systemic risk is attributable to a high 
correlation of asset returns that increases the likelihood of joint bank failure, see Acharya, supra 
note 5, at 232–35, while others focus on the increasing cost of capital caused by the default or 
failure of one firm. See Schwarcz, supra note 102,  at  204  (describing  systemic  risk  as  “the  risk  that  
(i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) 
either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, 
often evidenced by substantial financial-market   price   volatility”).   Other   academics   focus   on  
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The Dodd-Frank  Act  defines  systemic  risk  as  a  “default”  or  a  “danger  
of  default”  that  “would  have  serious  adverse  effects  on  financial  stability  in  
the  United  States.”235 Just as for academic understandings of systemic risk, 
the threshold for damage to the economy is not self-evident under this 
statutory definition. Therefore, the Act defers to the expertise and 
experience  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  which  must  certify  that  a  firm’s  
potential default raises this concern in order for the FDIC to assume 
receivership over a systemically important company.236 
The FGIC would face a similar mandate of certifying that the danger of 
a  beneficiary’s  potential  default  raises  systemic  risks  to  justify  making  an 
investment.237 Requiring the FGIC to certify that these systemic risk factors 
are  met   to   justify   its   investments  would   limit   the  scope  of   the  FGIC’s  
investments. At the same time, this approach would recognize the need for 
flexibility because what falls within   the  parameters  of  having  “serious  
adverse   effects   on   financial   stability”   may   vary   from   one   crisis   to  
another.238 
Limiting  the  FGIC’s  role  to  systemically  significant  companies  would  
be  a  controversial  part  of  this  proposal.  The  dividing  line  between  “too 
big”  or  “too  interconnected”  to  fail  and  less  significant  companies  would  
be hotly contested. However, the myriad of smaller companies and 
individuals would still have recourse to the political process. Just like flood 
or other catastrophe victims, these parties can seek to have Congress 
federalize their losses through legislation. It might be desirable to have all 
potential beneficiaries face the quid pro quo that comes with FGIC 
investment (to mitigate the need for future bailouts and recoup money for 
the  taxpayers).  However,  this  Article’s  approach  recognizes  both  the  limits  
of   what   policymakers   can   expect   of   the   FGIC’s   capabilities   and   the  
political reality that Congress may face overwhelming pressure to engage 
in federalization of losses for smaller entities and individuals if the scale of 
a crisis is large enough. 
Another concern is the level of investment risk that the FGIC could 
                                                                                                                     
political   effects   of   institutional   failure,   positing   that   a   firm  was   “too   big   to   fail”   and   put   the  
economy at risk if the median voter did not tolerate the economic effects of a failure. See Levitin, 
supra note 24, at 446–51. 
 235. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 203(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1451 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)). 
 236. Id. § 5383(a)(1)(A), (b).  
 237. Part of the problem is that perception, rather than reality, shapes market volatility and 
views of systemic risk. Therefore, the focus of managing systemic risk in a broad sense should be on 
mitigating panics and seeking to contain market anxieties until the panic subsides and bridge 
financing is no longer needed by beneficiaries. Ultimately, in spite of the imprecision of the concept 
of systemic risk, there is a virtue in requiring the government to make the case publicly for why 
systemic risk applies to justify its decisions and the extent of its bailout commitments.  
 238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1450 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)).  
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assume. One danger of bailouts is that they may creep into full-blown 
nationalizations as companies need more and more loans to stay afloat. 
Once the FGIC begins to invest loans, it may face perverse incentives to 
send bad money after good money in an effort to justify or preserve its 
initial investment.239 For this reason, it would be desirable to establish 
minimum capital requirement guidelines for beneficiaries to ensure that the 
FGIC  could  have  a   reasonable  prospect  of  recouping  the  government’s  
investment. This approach would be analogous to the capital requirements 
that banks must meet to avoid falling into receivership by the FDIC and 
being liquidated.240 Capital requirements would likely be much lower than 
in this case, as corporations do not face the same risks banks face of a run 
on the bank.241 However, the underlying principle would be similar: to 
delineate between companies that could remain solvent with FGIC 
investments and those that are on the brink of insolvency. Given the 
expanded role for the FDIC in winding down systemically important 
financial institutions, these capital requirements would also serve as a 
dividing   line   between   the   FGIC’s   and  FDIC’s   responsibilities.  Capital  
requirements, coupled with a cap limiting the FGIC to no more than 50% 
of the capitalization of any given company, would be designed to limit the 
degree  of  the  FGIC’s  risk  exposure  to  any  particular company. 
D.  Addressing Potential Objections to This Proposal 
1.  The Challenge of Sustaining FGIC Independence 
Critics may recognize that sustaining FGIC independence is an 
admirable goal yet argue that bailouts historically have had political 
fingerprints and private opportunism written all over them.242 Both 
Democrats and Republicans revel in directing funds to their corporate 
supporters  to  save  jobs  or  bolster  their  district’s  economy,243 and private 
companies are always eager to outsource their liabilities to the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See Painter, supra note 13,  at  159  (discussing  the  problem  of  government  trying  to  “bail”  
itself out of poor bailout decisions). 
 240. See Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall 
Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1. 
 241. See, e.g., Adam Wasch, FDIC Board Adopts Final Rule on Investments in Nonfinancial 
Firms, 77 BNA’S BANKING REP.  959  (2001)  (discussing  the  FDIC’s  lower  capital  requirements  for  
banks’  equity investments in nonfinancial companies). 
 242. For an overview of the challenges facing agency independence, see Rachel E. Barkow, 
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19–41 
(2010). 
 243. Democrats’  campaigns  have emphasized the impact of stimulus money on their districts in 
an attempt to localize political campaigns during a politically challenging year. Republicans have 
displayed hypocrisy in decrying bailout measures, yet lauding the impact of bailout and stimulus 
money in their own districts. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, State in Play: Rougher Road for Democrats 
Without Obama Atop Ticket, N.Y. TIMES,  July  4,  2010,  at  A01  (discussing  Democrats’  efforts  to  
localize campaigns by emphasizing positive impact of stimulus initiatives).  
1398 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
government. Given those incentives, skeptics might question whether a 
truly independent FGIC can exist or whether the temptation and 
opportunity for political and private actors to capture, politicize, and distort 
the  FGIC’s  agenda  will prove too overwhelming.244 
A similar concern exists concerning the revolving door between the 
FGIC and Wall Street firms (and their legal and accounting service 
providers).245 Many of the crucial political appointees who were asleep at 
the wheel during the recent crisis were from Wall Street or soon headed in 
that direction once their term in government service ended.246 For the FGIC 
to work, it would need this financial acumen, but there is also a genuine 
dilemma about which master to whom these actors would be beholden 
(either ex ante in terms of their connections or ex post when they are 
looking to cash in from their experience at the FGIC). The FGIC may need 
this talent to understand the complexities of its investment targets, but this 
expertise may come at a high price if FGIC employees engage in favoritism 
towards beneficiaries. 
There is not an easy solution to the private capture problem or to the 
overall   challenges   to   the   FGIC’s   independence.247 One way to temper 
politicization pressures is to impose limits on the nature and scope of the 
FGIC’s   investments,   limits   which   have   been   discussed   earlier   in   this  
Article. These limits may give the FGIC the ability to push back at 
politicians  who  are  clamoring  for  their  states’  prospective  beneficiaries  to  
receive aid by pointing at the constraints the FGIC faces. For example, the 
FGIC could potentially point to its capital requirement guidelines to justify 
not investing in a company whose balance sheets are underwater. 
Another  way   to  preserve   the  FGIC’s   independence is to have self-
financing of operations through existing investments.248 Politicians have 
                                                                                                                     
 244. See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 479–88 (2008) 
(discussing the increase in political capture of ostensibly independent agencies over the last 
generation). 
 245. See Barkow, supra note 242, at 23. 
 246. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators Are Finding Opportunities at Firms Looking for 
Government Experience, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2010, at A11 (discussing the revolving door of 
White House, Justice Department, SEC, and banking regulators heading to Wall Street and law 
firms). 
 247. See Painter, supra note 13, at 149–50  (discussing  how  “the  corrupting  influence  from  
private employment prospects is difficult to mitigate with regulation”). 
 248. The virtue of self-funding is that it would liberate the FGIC from political meddling or 
underfinancing that could compromise its ability to fulfill its mandate. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, 
Realizing The Dream Of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes 
Charge Of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 98–100 (2005) (discussing how the 
absence of self-funding  coupled  with  limited  congressional  funding  compromised  the  SEC’s  ability  
to police fraud); Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 
NOVA L. REV. 233, 253–58 (2004) (discussing how self-funding could free the SEC from political 
constraints and allow it to more adequately fulfill its mandate). 
2011] BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS 1399 
 
come up with any number of ways to spend the remainder of the $700 
billion in TARP money,249 but giving the FGIC the ability to draw on this 
money without additional legislative consent would be the most 
appropriate way to ensure that the bailout money serves its intended 
purpose. This approach would insulate the FGIC from the need for further 
congressional or executive branch grants of money (and the related 
political strings that may come with that funding), except in exceptional 
circumstances. These monies could be invested in treasuries or other short-
term instruments during times when they are not invested in bailout 
beneficiaries. 
The challenge of private capture is more difficult to overcome.250 
Washington,  D.C.’s  culture  of  soft  corruption  centers  on  the  revolving  door  
between the public and private sector.251 A significant part of low-paid 
regulators’  compensation  is  often  the  expected  value  of  the  salary  that  they  
will receive when they defect to work for the companies they are 
regulating.252 This incentive understandably leads to regulatory inaction or 
favoritism. This problem may even be sharper for the FGIC because of the 
fact that the agency would need workers with the technical skills to assess 
prospective investments (which would often come from private industry). 
One way to mitigate the concern of private capture would be to give FGIC 
employees higher salaries to woo and retain their expertise and also to 
impose a quid pro quo of more severe bars on joining firms that benefit 
from bailouts or their service providers (such as law and accounting 
firms).253 Most federal agencies currently have modest bars limiting their 
employees from dealing with their own former agency for one year.254 To 
justify the higher salaries and deter private capture, both the duration and 
nature of the ban on working for beneficiaries should be more expansive 
for FGIC employees.255 
                                                                                                                     
 249. See, e.g., David Cho & Michael D. Shear, TARP Funds in Play for Jobs Program; 
Obama Likely to Back Deal, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2009, at A10 (discussing how the Obama 
Administration supports spending part of repaid TARP funds for a new job-creation program). 
 250. For an overview of public choice theory, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) and JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997). 
 251. See Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Regulators Set to Lobby on New Financial Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 
27, 2010, at B01 (discussing the revolving door from financial regulators to the private sector). 
 252. See James S. Roberts, Jr., The  “Revolving  Door”:  Issues  Related  to  the  Hiring  of  Former  
Federal Government Employees, 43 ALA. L. REV. 343, 344 (1992). 
 253. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 13, at 155 (suggesting that government employees should 
face a one- to two-year bar on receiving compensation from bailout beneficiaries). 
 254. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (delineating the limits that former executive and legislative 
branch officials face in dealing with their former agencies). 
 255. Very senior officials and elected representatives face greater restrictions on dealing with 
matters under their supervision, which restrictions form a precedent for imposing more onerous 
restrictions on former FGIC officials. See id. § 207(d)–(e). 
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2.  Concern About Potential FGIC Overstretch and Federal Oversight 
Many critics may point out that fiscal constraint has not been a virtue 
of federal spending and that the federal government has had a poor track 
record in overseeing public and quasi-public agencies. The extensive 
spending on the bailouts and, as importantly, the related stimulus efforts 
suggests that a government unable to exercise spending constraints may 
fare  poorly  in  imposing  limits  on  the  FGIC.  The  government’s  track  record  
in overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, privately owned companies 
that served a public role as mortgage intermediaries, may raise similar 
concerns about the possibility of effective oversight of the FGIC.256 
Part of the paradox of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was that they were 
traded as privately held companies, but were subject to a conflict of 
control, incentives, and purpose through their public role (and related 
political pressures).257 In other words, intrinsic challenges exist from 
wearing both a public and private hat. In contrast, the FGIC would clearly 
be a public agency, but having the FGIC embrace an investment-oriented 
paradigm raises some similar issues. 
The challenge is how to oversee individual FGIC managers and the 
FGIC as a whole in order to avoid having the FGIC succumb to public 
pressure or become a government version of the speculators that they will 
be bailing out.258 One approach would be to have the President and 
Congress appoint a special Inspector General with a fixed term who would 
enjoy  broad  powers  to  review  the  FGIC’s  operations  and  investments  and  
serve to publicize FGIC missteps to the elected branches and the public.259 
For this reason, it is key that the FGIC face clear ex ante parameters to 
guide its investments and maintain transparency about the scope and nature 
of its investments, in order to facilitate oversight and accountability. This 
                                                                                                                     
 256. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., REP. ON THE 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN CREATING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 
2008, at 2 (2009), reprinted in Role of the Lending Industry in the Home Foreclosure Crisis: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 111th Cong. 363 (2009) 
(discussing  how  poor  oversight  of  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  allowed  them  to  “privatize[]  their  
profits but socialize[] their risks, creating powerful incentives for them to act recklessly and 
exposing  taxpayers  to  tremendous  losses”). 
 257. See Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A01 (discussing how Fannie acquiesced to political pressure to purchase 
subprime mortgage-backed securities). 
 258. This challenge would be especially pronounced over time, as FGIC officials would face 
similar  temptations  to  those  regulators  face:  the  imposition  of  “stricter regulation after a crash, 
followed  by  gradual  relaxation  thereafter”  in  the  face  of  industry  pressure. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
supra note 220, at 821. 
 259. Part of the TARP program entailed the appointment of a special Inspector General who 
served  as  a  watchdog  over  the  Treasury  Department’s  operations.  See U.S. Office of the SIGTARP: 
Welcome, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
http://www.sigtarp.gov (last updated June 17, 2011). Extending this concept to the FGIC would be 
a straightforward way to ensure some degree of transparency.  
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approach is not a panacea, as questions would remain about how to deal 
with FGIC failures. However, independent oversight would be designed to 
avoid  political  meddling  with  the  FGIC’s  mandate. 
A related concern is that creating the FGIC and entrusting the agency 
with a bailout fund would create incentives for the FGIC to make 
investments simply to justify its own existence and payroll. Bureaucracies 
are always tempted to work to spend their budget to justify future 
allocations and to produce results for congressional overseers and the 
public.260 But the incentives to expand the mandate may be even higher for 
the FGIC, as its investor focus may mean that its internal and external 
benchmark for success will be its return on its investments. The irony is the 
FGIC’s   investments   will   be   countercyclical   because   its   moments   of  
greatest passivity will likely be at the peak of the investment cycle when 
market actors are reaping the highest returns. The FGIC may therefore be 
tempted by the same herding effects that distort market investing in the 
effort to chase higher returns.261 
Overly aggressive investing by the FGIC may blur the line between 
investments in systemically significant companies facing liquidity 
problems and purely speculative investments. This concern is particularly 
important given the function of the FGIC. This approach would not only 
lock up investment funds that would be needed in an emergency, but also 
raise concerns about excessive entanglement between the private and 
public sector. The ability to turn on the bailout when needed and turn it off 
when it is not needed is a tricky challenge that does not have an easy 
answer. 
The best way to temper FGIC overstretch may be to deter prospective 
beneficiaries from seeking and accepting bailout investments. Investments 
by the FGIC must have significant enough consequences for managers, 
shareholders, and creditors of beneficiaries to make the appeal of FGIC 
investments truly be a last resort. This approach would serve as a check not 
only on private sector companies, but also on the FGIC, by creating 
incentives to resist FGIC investment offers. 
3.  Dangers of Creating a (De Facto) Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Policymakers may acknowledge the stabilizing potential of the FGIC, 
yet still be concerned about the distorting effects of a de facto sovereign 
wealth fund on the economy. Similar concerns about political motivations 
for   investments   have   come   up   concerning   sovereign   wealth   funds’  
                                                                                                                     
 260. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–42 
(paperback ed. 2007) (discussing how bureaucracies try to spend annual budgets to secure equal or 
higher budgets in the future). 
 261. See Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV & Chris Sagers, Faith-Based Financial Regulation: A 
Primer on Oversight of Credit Rating Organizations, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 557, 590 (2009) 
(discussing growing empirical evidence of herding effects in financial markets). 
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investments in the United States. Like the FGIC, sovereign wealth funds 
are   “government   investment   vehicles . . . which manage those assets 
separately  from  official  reserves.”262 Their virtue is analogous to the FGIC 
as  these  “long-term investment vehicles look . . . beyond quarterly results 
and therefore [potentially] serve as stable funding sources during financial 
turbulence.”263 For example, during the recent crisis, a number of 
sovereign wealth funds demonstrated this role by injecting capital into 
struggling American banks.264 
Nonetheless, critics are concerned about the potential for sovereign 
wealth   funds   to   engage   in   “unfair   competition,   corruption,   and  
politically—or strategically—motivated  investments.”265 These fears may 
have some plausibility for foreign sovereign wealth funds, some of which 
are tools of governments with (potentially) adverse national interests.266 
Foreign officials may use investments as an extension of economic and 
foreign policy,267 such as large-scale derivatives bets designed to weaken 
other  countries’  corporations  or  industries  or  to  disrupt national markets.268 
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Series, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477725. 
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taken proactive steps to demonstrate that their investment intentions are to generate returns and not 
to acquire stakes in sensitive or strategic industries. Id. For example, Chinese and Russian sovereign 
wealth funds informed the U.S. Treasury that they do not intend to invest in strategic industries, and 
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While the FGIC would not raise the concerns of subversion, skeptics may 
be concerned about the distorting effects of government investment. For 
example, bailouts for failing automakers and their suppliers may redirect 
scarce capital away from other sectors that are more competitive. Similarly, 
FGIC investment decisions may be interpreted as a signal by the 
marketplace  of  which  sectors  or  firms  are  “safe,”  and  therefore  give  them  
unfair advantages over competitors who have not received FGIC funds. 
Distortion concerns may become especially significant if politicians 
successfully pressure the FGIC to invest in politically influential sectors of 
the economy in order to bolster their campaign supporters. 
Part of the solution to this problem is maintaining the independence of 
the FGIC. Investors may still interpret FGIC investments as a green light 
for private sector loans to industries and companies in which the FGIC 
invests. But concerns about politically driven decisions or corruption may 
be best   safeguarded   against   by   firmly   entrenching   the   FGIC’s  
independence from the political process. 
One other concern about the FGIC is one that many sovereign wealth 
funds experienced during the crisis. Creating a hedge fund or sovereign 
wealth fund is no sure-fire recipe for success. Professionalization and 
institutionalization may not be a cure-all. The backing of the state (or of a 
large pool of state funds) may empower FGIC managers to make poor 
investment decisions. For example, most of the major sovereign wealth 
funds made substantial investments in the American financial sector during 
the early stages of the crisis, including funds based in China, Singapore, 
and Dubai.269 But these sovereign wealth funds timed their investments 
quite poorly, and ironically, they were only bailed out from even worse 
losses  because  of   the   federal  government’s   intervention   to  prop  up   the  
financial sector. FGIC managers may be similarly tempted to make poor 
investment decisions, which underscores the importance of delineating 
guidelines for FGIC investments and effective oversight. 
4.  Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approach to Conditioning Bailouts 
Skeptics may argue that what matters in a crisis is filling liquidity gaps 
as quickly as possible and that policymakers have enough leverage to 
impose whatever conditions are necessary after the fact. This ex post logic 
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drove  the  federal  government’s  ad  hoc  response  to  the  financial  crisis  and  
lives   on   in  Congress’   failure   to  develop   a   framework   for  dealing  with  
future bailouts.270 But because of this failure, government responses to 
financial crises inevitably become a form of containment strategy designed 
to plug the widening holes in the dikes.271 The containment strategy has 
two perverse effects. First, it emboldens financial institutions to take on 
greater risks based on the assumption that so long as they act in concert  
they will reap positive returns while the government will mitigate 
catastrophic losses. Second, containment strategies are easily gamed by 
prospective beneficiaries who may leverage the threat of financial dikes 
bursting to their advantage. Ironically, by not having a clear framework in 
place for bailouts, companies may have every incentive to magnify risks 
because the government is unlikely to impose meaningful conditions on aid 
if the government is desperate to avoid economic catastrophe. 
The  Treasury  Department’s  experience  with  the  TARP  underscored  the  
challenges of imposing conditions after the fact. Not only did the Treasury 
Department fail to impose any significant conditions after loans were 
made, but also the Treasury Department did not even exercise powers that 
were ostensibly linked to bailout aid after banks recovered.272 
The best illustration of this point is the failure of executive pay 
limitations. The Bush and Obama Administrations both emphasized the 
fact that TARP beneficiaries would face limitations, including caps on top 
executive pay and potential clawbacks if beneficiaries provided excessive 
compensation to executives.273 The irony is that TARP conditions on 
executive pay encouraged beneficiaries to increase executive stock options 
as the primary form of compensation, which meant that the government 
bailout dollars ultimately translated into higher executive pay as stock 
prices recovered.274 While the Treasury Department belatedly recognized 
that TARP beneficiaries overpaid executives by billions of dollars, the 
Treasury Department lacked the political will to exercise its clawback 
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 273. See Verret, supra note 91, at 303. 
 274. See id. 
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powers.275 The unmistakable conclusion is that by failing to lay out clear 
conditions up front, the TARP program played right into the hands of 
beneficiaries   who   were   able   to   neutralize   the   Treasury   Department’s  
potential power once beneficiaries regained their strength. In American 
democracy, money talks more than power, and the $251 million that banks 
spent on lobbying to thwart financial reform went far towards eviscerating 
ex post attempts to address the financial crisis.276 
The virtue of ex ante regulation is that establishing clear, settled 
expectations can provide guidance to both industry and regulators.277 Every 
rule and regulation triggers loophole seeking and tests of its limits, but 
credible commitments can put all parties on notice of what the likely 
responses will be and make it harder for politicians to deviate from 
existing frameworks for aid. The seventy-year experience with the FDIC 
highlights this point. While some significant deviations for large banks 
took place during the current crisis,278 the existence and success of the 
FDIC in winding up ailing institutions has made it much more difficult for 
politicians to depart from the settled framework for wind-ups. 
The  primary  limitation  of  ex  ante  approaches,  such  as  this  Article’s  
proposal, is that although ex ante reforms are shaped in anticipation of a 
future crisis, they can only be made through reflection on what has already 
occurred.279 Any comparative advantage that ex ante regulation may have 
may be mitigated by limits in the ability to anticipate the nature of future 
crises.280 For this reason, policymakers need not only to create rules to 
anticipate and address future crises, but also to create institutions equipped 
with the skills and authority to adapt to the particular wrinkles of future 
crises. The hope is that a well-designed FGIC would be well-positioned to 
anticipate and react to future cataclysms. 
CONCLUSION 
The greatest challenge facing this proposal is mitigating the moral 
hazard inherent in any bailout contingency planning. Investors will 
undoubtedly attempt to analyze how deep the pockets of the Federal 
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Government Investment Corporation are and the likelihood of intervention 
and  factor  that  into  their  investment  decisions.    Skeptics  may  fear  that  “if  
you   build   it,   they   will   come,”   in   a   perverse   way.   Firms  may   seek   to  
maximize risk and returns, while pushing off as much of the downside risk 
as they can onto the federal government. 
In spite of this concern, this Article has shown how institutionalizing 
an investor role for the FGIC and establishing clear contours and 
conditions for bailouts would temper corporate risk-taking and protect 
taxpayers. Preserving the status quo of uncertainty for future bailouts 
would only embolden reckless risk-taking. Companies will count on the 
fact that desperate politicians will do anything to spur the economy in the 
face of another crisis. In contrast, establishing an independent agency with 
clear parameters for bailout aid would create a depoliticized, settled way of 
addressing future financial instability that would complement the long-
established FDIC framework for winding up insolvent financial firms. The 
prospect of investments by the FGIC would stabilize markets by 
establishing the terms for government investments in ailing firms. At the 
same time, FGIC conditions of having managers, shareholders, and 
creditors face cuts to their stakes, proportional sharing of returns with the 
FGIC over a multiyear time horizon, and imposing corporate governance 
reforms would provide disincentives for corporations to receive or rely 
excessively on FGIC funds. While creating an independent FGIC would 
face political hurdles, this proposal offers a practical pathway for 
addressing and defusing future financial crises and protecting taxpayers in 
the process.    
